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DIVERSIFICATION: IMPACT OF MONOPOLY POLICY
UPON MULTI-PRODUCT FIRMS
G. E. HALE t
Production or distribution of more than one commodity, com-
monly called diversification, is a widespread phenomenon in modern
industry. Degrees of diversification vary widely. A manufacturer
may produce two sizes of the same screw-driver;' another may offer
photographic film in both color and black-and-white.2 Some firms
spread across an entire industry; ' others lap over into adjacent fields.4
In some instances the commodities produced are wholly dissimilar: a
prominent company has two subsidiaries, one building railway cars and
the other erecting oil refineries.5 Investment trusts carry diversifica-
tion farther. While some focus upon a specific industry ' and others
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1. Conant, One or Many Linesf Barron's, July 8, 1940, p. 7.
2. Richmond, Profits Out of Pictures, Magazine of Wall Street, Oct. 23, 1937,
p. 27. A tobacco company makes six brands of cigarettes, nine brands of smoking
tobacco and nine brands of chewing tobacco. LIGGETT & MYERS TOBACCO COMPANY,
ANN. REP. FOR 1948 at 12. A prominent insurance company does two principal lines
of business. Under the heading of "bonding business" it lists fidelity bonds, bankers'
bonds, fiduciary bonds, public official bonds, court bonds, forgery bonds and contract
bonds. Under the heading of "casualty insurance" it lists workmen's compensation,
automobile liability, automobile theft, general liability, burglary, accident and health,
boiler and machinery, glass and water damage. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY,
ANN. REP. FOR 1948 at 19.
3. A rubber manufacturer produced tires and tubes, footwear, raincoats, hose,
belting, motor mountings, foam latex rubber, baby pants, gloves and toys. U.S.
Rubber's Two-Way Stretch, Bus. Week, Dec. 11, 1948, p. 83. (Subsequently the
same firm diversified into the production of plastics, lastex yarn, radiant heating
panels, textiles, laundry starch and chemicals. Id. at 84.)
4. A 32-page booklet entitled Products and Processes was enclosed with 1948
ANN. REP., UNION CARBIDE AND CHEMICAL CORP. It listed the products of the com-
pany in five general groups as follows: (1) alloys and metals, (2) chemicals, (3)
electrodes, carbons and batteries, (4) industrial gases and carbide and (5) plastics.
The products themselves were too numerous to count: E. I. DuPont deNemours &
Company operates through ten departments plus a Mexican subsidiary, four controlled
companies and four subsidiaries engaged in foreign trade. Each manufacturing de-
partment has a long list of products. E. I. DUPONT DENEMoURs & Co., ANN. REP.,
1948, at 48 et seq. In addition thereto, it owns 10,000,000 shares of the common stock
of General Motors Corporation, constituting 22.7% of the outstanding common stock.
Id. at 19. Cf. AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORP., ANN. REP., 1948, at 23 et seq.;
GENERAL ELECTRIC Co., ANN. REP., 1948, at 23 et seq.; General Motors, Fortune, Dec.
1938, p. 41, 44 et seq., 170 et sea.
5. PULLMAN, INC., ANN. REP., 1948, at 7 et sea.
6. CHEMICAL FUND, INC., ANN. REP., 1948, at 4, 6, 13. Insurance companies are
similar to investment trusts. MARYLAND CASUALTY Co., ANN. REP., 1948, at 10
et seq.
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provide management for any type of enterprise,7 the majority are in-
tentionally "diversified" over the whole field of commerce. This article
examines the relationship between diversification and the problem of
monopoly.
Multi-product firms are one of several types giving rise to mo-
nopoly problems. Vertical integration, the combination of successive
stages of production or distribution in a single concern, is another.8
The term "horizontal integration" usually refers to a union of former
competitors making the same product. Diversification is sometimes
called "distribution" or "circuitous" " or "conglomerate" or "lateral" 10
integration. Its existence in trade is roughly as common as vertical
integration." But to date its bearing upon monopoly has received less
attention.
A PAGE OF HISTORY
Diversification is a recent phenomenon. Early corporate charters
were granted for narrow purposes, and in the eighteenth century com-
panies seem to have had only one general mission. Thus a concern
was organized as an insurance company, a bank, a toll bridge company
or a turnpike company. 2 A few firms were granted authority to un-
dertake different objects, but usually in such obvious combinations as
operating both a bridge and a toll road or both a bridge and a canal.
13
In general, legislatures were chary of granting, and the companies
hesitant to ask, combinations of diverse powers.
4
Because the system of special acts had led to abuses and scandals,
in the latter part of the nineteenth century many states turned away
from the practice of granting special charters to corporations. The
first to do so was New Jersey, which amended its constitution in 1875
to forbid the further granting of such privileges.'" Other states quickly
7. HaPpy AGWI, Fortune, Feb. 1949, p. 16; Financial Fun after Fifty, Modem
Industry, April 15, 1948, p. 67.
8. Hale, Vertical Integration, 49 Cot. L. REv. 921 (1949). Cf. Cwnadian Pacific
Railway, Fortune, Sept. 1930, pp. 42, 144. (Railroad's investments in hotels, coal
mining ventures, etc.. made chiefly to create traffic.)
9. Hale, Trust Dissolution, 40 COL. L. REv. 615, 626 (1940).
10. BUcHANAN, THE EcoNoMIcs OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 309 (1940).
11. THORP AND CROWDER, THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY 168 (T.N.E.C. Mono-
graph #27, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1941). Unfortunately the census data from which
the foregoing conclusions were reached is not sufficiently precise to permit fine dis-
tinctions between the various types of integration. Id. at 597.
12. 2 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 22
et seq. (1917). A railroad chartered to operate from X to Y cannot divert its capital
from the objects contemplated and extend its lines to Z. Pearce v. Madison &
Indianapolis Railroad, 62 U.S. 441, 443 (1858) ; cf. Banet v. Alton Railroad, 13 IIl.
504 (1851).
13. 2 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 12, at 318.
14. Id. at "319. Cf. Ramsey v. Tod, 95 Tex. 614, 69 S.W. 133 (1902) ; Williams
v. Citizens' Enterprise Co., 25 Ind. App. 351, 57 N.E. 581 (1900). But cf. Marion
Bond Co. v. Mexican Coffee Co., 160 Ind. 558, 65 N.E. 748 (1902).
15. Davis, op. cit. supra note 12, at 205.
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followed. The reaction against abuses incidental to special charters,
joined with the feeling that there should be full equality of opportunity
to incorporate, encouraged the adoption of general incorporation acts.'0
Today almost every state grants corporate charters under general stat-
utes whereby the issuance of the authority becomes a ministerial act."1
It follows that the persons forming a corporation may choose the
powers it shall enjoy. As a consequence, corporate charters now gen-
erally contain broadly diversified authority.'
About the same time several allied developments helped clear the
way for diversified enterprise. New legislation made amendment of
corporate charters far easier. Common law and statutory rules re-
quiring unanimous consent of shareholders were abrogated. 9 Today
it is the general practice to permit broad amendments with few
formalities.2"
Relaxation of the formerly rigorous doctrine of ultra vires has
had a similar effect. Until recent times the corporate charter was the
strict measure of a company's powers. Any action beyond its confines
was unlawful 2 and the corporation itself could plead its own lack of
capacity in order to defeat the obligation of contracts entered into in
good faith. Gross injustice was often the result. In the first third of
the present century a revulsion from the doctrine 2 resulted in legis-
lative action. In most jurisdictions today only the state or the share-
holders may assert that corporate acts are ultra vires.8
One further aspect of state incorporation statutes deserves men-
tion. When one concern holds stock in another, diversification may
result just as readily as in the case of a corporation empowered to em-
16. DODD AND BAKER, CASES ON BusINEss ASSOCIATIONS 20 (1940). See also
Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U.L.Q.
305, 306 (1937).
17. Rutledge, supra note 16, at 313 et seq.
18. Re Humphrey Advertising Co., 177 Fed. 187, 188 (7th Cir. 1910).
19. Dodd, Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 50 HARv. L.
REV. 27, 33, 37 (1936).
20. See Rutledge, supra note 16, at 324 et seq.
21. MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 23 (1st ed. 1882). In People ex tel.
Peabody v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 283, 22 N.E. 798, 799 (1889) it was
said: "Corporations may only exercise such powers as may be conferred by the legis-
lative body creating them, either in express terms, or by necessary implication . . ."
Only slight deviations were permitted under the doctrine. Brown v. Winnisimmet
Co., 11 Allen 326, 333 (Mass. 1865) ; 6 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS § 2535 (Perm. ed. 1931).
22. Hale, A Field for Corporate Law Revision--Collateral Attack, 11 ILL. L.
REV. 1, 2 et seq. (1927). Ease of amendment had removed the substance of even the
state's obligation to ultra vires acts. Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires
be Discarded?, 33 YALE L.J. 49. 64 (1923).
23. E.g., Illinois Gdneral Corporation Act, 1919, .75. Cf. Rutledge Significant
Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 305, 310 (1937). Ultra
vires was a doctrine designed primarily to protect the dissenting shareholder. BRIcE,
ULTRA VnREs 78n. (Green ed. 1880). Diversification was not regarded as dangerous
to the state. Thompson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in Relation to Private Corpora-
tions, 28 Am!. LAW REV. 376, 396 et seq. (1894) ; Carpenter, supra note 22, at 64.
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bark upon several different branches of endeavor. Until modern times
corporations were not allowed to hold stock of other corporations.24
About the same time that special charters were replaced by articles of
incorporation under general acts, the states began to permit corpora-
tions to hold stock,26 until today the law in almost every state permits
it.26  It is true that there are some limitations in the permissive stat-
utes. For example, the former Illinois law permitted one corporation
to hold stock in another so long as the acquisition did not substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. 7 It was clear, how-
ever, that the limitation in question was designed to prevent horizontal
integration and not diversification. Thus an express provision de-
clared:
This section shall not apply to corporations pur-
chasing . . . stock solely for investment . . . nor shall any-
thing contained in this section prevent a corporation from causing
the formation of a subsidiary corporation or from owning stock
in such a corporation, for the actual carrying on of its immediate
lawful business or the natural and legitimate branches or exten-
sions thereof. ..
It is worth noting that section 7 of the Clayton Act, after which the
quoted statute was modelled, itself permitted the formation of sub-
sidiary corporations for the same purposes. 9
Thus within the field of the "private" law of corporations-that
branch of the law dealing with corporate powers and the relationship
of the component parts of the association-diversification is now readily
achieved. Indeed, it is unquestioned that diversified business may be
conducted in corporate form.
24. See, e.g., Hall v. Woods, 325 Ill. 114, 130, 156 N.E. 258, 264 (1927). Accord:
Golden v. Cervenka, 278 Ill. 409, 440, 116 N.E. 273, 286 (1917). See HALE, THE
LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS IN ILLINOIS 7 (1916); Hale, Holding Companies in
Illinois Law, 7 ILL. L. Rav. 529, 535 (1913) ; 6 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 2825 (Perm. ed. 1931).
25. Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations, 13 HARV. L. REV. 198, 207
(1899) ; Rutledge, supra note 23, at 307.
26. E.g., Roth v. Ahrensfeld, 300 Ill. App. 312, 321, 21 N.E.2d 21, 25 (1939),
aff'd, 373 Ill. 550, 27 N.E.2d 445 (1940).
27 Illinois General Corporation Act § 7, ILL. REV. STATS. c. 32, §§ 1 et seq. (1931).
28. Ibid.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1946), where it is provided that nothing therein shall prevent
a corporation from "causing the formation of subsidiary corporations for the actual
carrying-on of their immediate lawful business, or the natural and legitimate branches
or extensions thereof . . ." Limitations remain in selected fields. National Banking
Act, 18 STAT. 123 (1874) as amended, 12 U.S.C. §24 (1946). National banking
associations are also prohibited from underwriting the issuance of securities. Ibid.
Utilities often are denied the privilege of holding stock. Annotated Laws of Mass.,
c. 156 § 5 (1948). See Steckler v. Pennroad Corp., 44 F. Supp. 800, 803 (E.D. Pa.
1942). Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79i (1946). The In-
vestment Co. Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 (b) (1) (1946), defines a "diversified
company" as one with no more than 5% of its assets invested in the securities of a
single issuer. But, in general, the holding of stock is now condoned. BON3RIGHT AND
MEANS, THE HOLDING COmPANY 64 (1932).
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ASSUMED LEGALITY OF DIVERSIFICATION IN PAST
Our problem is the relationship between diversification and the
law of monopoly, which includes the common law of the several states,
state legislation and the familiar federal antitrust acts. Although such
law long ago parted company with the "private" law of corporations,
monopoly policy in the past has not frowned upon diversification.
Perhaps the leading case is United States v. Winslow," the first
major decision in the trio affecting the United Shoe Machinery Co.
It was there proven that the defendants had combined three previously
existing concerns. The first of those firms was the producer of 60%
of the lasting machines used in the manufacture of shoes, while the
second made 80% of the welt sewing machines and outsole stitching
machines. The third produced 70% of the heeling machines and 80%
of all metallic fastening machines. All the machines in question were
protected by patent rights. The combined concern refused to sell ma-
chines but leased them to shoe manufacturers on condition that each
lessee use all the machines produced by the combination. It was held
that the defendants had not violated the Sherman Act. Mr. Justice
Holmes, laying stress upon the lack of competition between the three
component firms in the combination, said:
As . . . they did not compete with one another, it is hard
to see why the collective business should be any worse than its
component parts. It is said that from 70% to 80% of all the shoe
machinery business was put into a single hand. . . . Taking it
as true we can see no greater objection to one corporation manu-
facturing 70% of three non-competing groups of patented ma-
chines collectively used for making a single product than to those
corporations making the same proportion of one group each. The
disintegration aimed at by the statute does not extend to reducing
all manufacture to isolated units of the lowest degree. 1
In many ways the Winslow case is a perfect authority for the proposi-
tion that diversification is lawful. Since each machine was protected by
patents, the combination could lawfully enjoy a high percentage of the
output of that particular commodity. Yet the fact that such high
percentages of total production were attained for each of the several
commodities makes the case a stronger authority for the proposition
30. United States v. Winslow, 195 Fed. 578 (D. Mass. 1912) aff'd 227 U. S. 202
(1913). Argument for the defendant stressed the fact that the combination did not
involve previously competing firms. Cf. United States Shoe Machinery Co. v.
LaChapelle, 212 Mass. 467, 478, 99 N.E. 289, 291 (1912).
31. United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 217 (1913). A similar result was
reached in the lower court in 195 Fed. 578 (D. Mass. 1912). Accord: United States
v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
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that diversification does not infringe the statute. Subsequently, of
course, the tying clauses involved in the leases of the shoe machinery
company were declared unlawful under the specific prohibitions of sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act. 2
Another important decision is Alexander Milburn & Co. v. Union
Carbide and Carbon Corp.33 That was an action for triple damages
under section 7 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ants, Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. and its subsidiary corpora-
tions, constituted a combination in restraint of trade whereby the plain-
tiff had suffered damages. One subsidiary was a maker of calcium
carbide. Another, the Prest-O-Lite Co., converted calcium carbide
into acetylene gas. Oxweld Acetylene Co. produced apparatus for
welding with acetylene gas. Oxweld Railroad Service Co. used the
foregoing products to weld railroad equipment in various locations. It
was held that the combination was not unlawful. In the course of his
opinion Judge Parker said:
Of course plaintiff has shown a combination existing on the
part of these defendants; but it has not shown a combination in
restraint of trade. Their business . . is not competing but
complementary.
. . As there is no competition between their products, the
unity of control secured by the stock ownership of Union Carbide
and Carbon Corp. cannot be said to stifle competition between the
companies themselves. The combination results not in suppres-
sion of competition, but in greater efficiency on the part of the
constituent companies, and although as pointed out by plaintiff,
this unified control results in bringing larger resources under one
management, mere size does not constitute a violation of the Act
. nor is it violated merely by reason of the fact that there is
brought under control companies engaged in non-competing
branches of the industry.
3 4
32. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1946); United Shoe Machinery Corp.
v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
33. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 15 F.2d 678 (4th
Cir. 1926) cert. de. 273 U.S. 757 (1927).
34. Id. at 682 et seq. As to the old trust dissolution cases, it is said in Hale,
Trust Dissolution, 40 COL. L. REv. 615, 625 (1940) : "There was only a slight amount
of circuitous dissolution in the oil case and while the snuff and cigar companies were
cut loose in the tobacco decree, the three large successor units were 'full line' com-
panies. All of the successor units in the powder case were 'full line' producers and
later the decree was modified to permit one of them to purchase the assets of a non-
competing concern. Explicit disapproval of circuitous integration (involving cameras
and films) was voiced in the photographic equipment case, but the decree as finally
framed abandoned the notion."
In United States v. International Harvester Company, 248 U.S. 587 (1918)
apparently no effort was made to disturb the defendant's production of several types
of farm implements. It was only ordered to dispose of certain brands thereof (decree
not reported).
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A third decision approving diversification is found in the sequel
to the famous Standard Oil case.3 In 1931 application was made to
the court which had decreed dissolution of the old Standard Oil Com-
pany for permission to merge the Standard Oil Company of New York
with the Vacuum Oil Company. The former, commonly known as
Socony, was chiefly engaged in the marketing of gasoline and kerosene.
Vacuum was principally a refiner of high quality lubricants. The court
approved the merger of those two successor concerns with the result
that both vertical integration and diversification were extended. One
of the reasons given for the approval was that there was little real
competition between the two concerns. Each produced different prod-
ucts. Accordingly the court said:
It is clear that there are sound business reasons for this
merger which are entirely sufficient and are wholly unconnected
with any design to create a monopoly.3
Thus it is seen that despite vast enlargement of corporate powers
under "liberalized" state statutes, there have been few suggestions in
the past that diversification was or should be unlawful. 7 Possibly
Professor Handler may be taken to have hinted that the case of the
United States v. Reading Co." casts doubts upon diversification, 9 and
it is true that some remarks of Mr. Justice Cardozo can be given similar
interpretation. 40 Not until 1941, however, did any court in effect dis-
approve of diversification as opposed to our anti-monopoly policy.
35. United States v. Standard Oil Company, 47 F.2d 288 (E.D. Mo. 1931).
36. Id. at 310 et seq. Cf. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, MERGmS
AND THE LAW 89 (1929).
37. But see dissent in Eckman v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 169
Ill. 312, 324, 48 N.E. 496, 500 (1897). A similar objection was raised in the eighteenth
century: 1 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 388,
429 (1917). For a modern version of the same vague fears, see ARNOLD, THE
BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS 24 et seq. (1940). Cf. the statutes of mortmain, I BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 479* (Cooley's 3d ed. 1884); 2
DAvIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CoRPoRATIONS 317 (1917);
Hale, A Field for Corporate Law Revisior---Collateral Attack, 11 ILL. L. REv. 1, 8
(1916) ; National Home Building Association v. Home Savings Bank, 181 Ill. 35, 41,
54 N.E. 619, 620 (1899).
38. 253 U.S. 26 (1920). A bill was filed to dissolve intercorporate relations
under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and upon the commodities clause, 34 STAT. 585
(1906); 49 U.S.C. § 1[8] (1946). A holding company had been formed to own a
coal company and a railway company operating in and serving the Schuylkill anthracite
field, which is the largest of three fields in Pennsylvania. Subsequently, the com-
bination bought an interest in Central Railway Company of New Jersey, one of six
carriers serving the Wyoming anthracite field and itself an owner of a coal company.
It was held that the combination must be dissolved, emphasis being laid upon the
combination of competing railway companies and coal companies (whether the con-
cerns actually competed may be another question).
39. Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-trust Laws, 32 COL. L. REv. 179
at 230 (1932) where it was said: "The conclusion is inescapable that the union of the
Reading and the Central interests did not stifle competition in the industry at large;
at best it merely eliminated competition between two of the largest factors. No one
can read the court's opinion without feeling that what is being forbidden is the com-
bination of giant companies doing a substantial part of the business in their fields."
40. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932).
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Now storm clouds are gathering. In 1936 Professor Burns ex-
pressed considerable misgivings in regard to diversification. He found
that it might have consequences similar to non-price competition from
which consumers might benefit little. Buyers might be confused by the
spread of one brand name over several unrelated products 41 and the
application of profits to wholly new ventures might invite monopolistic
results.42
In 1941 there was decided the General Motors case,43 in which the
court found that General Motors and one of its subsidiaries conducting
a business in the financing of automobiles had violated the Sherman
Act. The theory was that the two corporations had conspired to com-
pel dealers to use the finance service. The word diversification was not
mentioned but an implication of disapproval was clearly present.
More recently the Attorney General objected vigorously to a lower
court decree permitting railroad companies to purchase the sleeping
car business of The Pullman Company.44 He argued that such an
arrangement would make it impossible for anyone else to offer sleeping
car service.
In 1949 an important study of monopoly was published by
Professor Edwards. His program for maintaining a free, competitive
economic system included the elimination of "bigness." His strictures
against size were not limited to "horizontal" integration: they spe-
cifically included diversified firms. He asserted that such concerns
could play one market off against another and disregard short term
costs in manipulating resources from one field to another.45
Later that same year the Attorney General filed a complaint
against the DuPont Company and others.46 There he alleged that
common control of DuPont, General Motors and United States Rubber
41. In BuRxs, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 453 (1936) it is said: ". . . in so
far as one product tends, or is deliberately used, to 'sell' another, the buyer is confused
in his distribution of expenditure; products sold under the same brand name are not
necessarily equally desirable."
42. Ibid.
43. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert.
de. 314 U.S. 618 (1941). In that year, too, Illinois enacted an amazing statute pro-
hibiting sales outside the regular course of trade, ILL. Rnv. STATS. C. 1213A, § 204
(1949).
44. United States v. The Pullman Co., acff'd per curiam, 330 U.S. 806 (1947).
On appeal, the question was whether the railroads should be permitted to own The
Pullman Company and thus to furnish sleeping car service as well as coach service
to their passengers. In that connection the brief of the United States declared (p.
28): "It is apparent on its face that the rail plan vests in the commonly owned Pull-
man Company a complete monopoly of the market in the operation and servicing of
sleeping cars . . . under the rail plan it would be impossible for anyone else to get
into the sleeping car business."
45. EowARDs, MAINTAINING COMPETITION: REQUISITES OF A GOVERNMENTAL
POLCY 106 (1949).
46. United States v. E.I. DuPont deNemours and Co., N.D. Ill., E.D. No. 49 C
1071 (1949). Cf. United States v. Lorain Journal Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP.
61,227 (D. Ohio, 1949).
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resulted in an agreement among those three corporations to trade with
each other to the exclusion of outside suppliers. Again the charge was
couched in the familiar form of "conspiracy." But the complaint also
(perhaps somewhat inconsistently) alleged common control. Hence
adverse implications for diversification were inescapable.
A few weeks thereafter a member of the Congress in charge of a
monopoly investigation stated that he was opposed to "conglomerate
operations." And he denounced the use of profits earned in one in-
dustry to diversify into another.17  Thus the stage is set for an explicit
assault upon diversification as such.
ORIGINS OF DIVERSIFICATION AND ITS RELATION TO EFFICIENCY
Before examining specific complaints against diversification it may
be well to set forth a general outline of its origins.4" Considerations
which cause business men to diversify may play a twofold role in
analysis of diversification's effects. They suggest the different forms
in which the multi-product firm appears. They also throw light on the
efficiency which diversification achieves, for often an entrepreneur adds
a new product in order to reduce costs. The scale of such economies
may be difficult to estimate. We can, however, take account of their
nature and proceed to suggest their effect upon the economy as a whole.
Fuller use of existing facilities. If a concern finds a new use for
the raw material presently required in its business, diversification may
be the result. Thus 'a maker of glass containers used the same basic
material to branch out into the manufacture of glass brick for build-
ings, glass insulation and glass filters.4 9 "By-products" are another
cause of diversification. Thorp found that at least half the products
made by 47 out of 50 of the largest companies accounted each for less
than half of 1% of those firms' gross sales.5 ° In other words, minor
47. Celler, Breaking Up Big Business, U.S. News & World Rep., Sept. 23, 1949,
pp. 28, 31.
48. Some general but not too acute discussion of the causes of diversification is
found in Whitmore, Shaping 1937 Policies to Side-Step Competition, American Bus.,
Nov. 1936; The Profits of Diversification, Bus. Week, May 29, 1937, pp. 35, 36.
49. The Profits of Diversification, Bus. Week, May 29, 1937, p. 40. Basic identity
of materials led Dow Chemical Company into the magnesium alloy business. Id. at 41.
Similarly, Eastman Kodak Company went into the plastics business. Barnes, What's
in a Name, Magazine of Wall Street, April 12, 1947, pp. 30, 32. Exhaustion of the
soil led a fruit grower into the production of other crops. ANN. REP., 1948, UNiTrD
FRUIT Co., at 8, 21. It should also be noted that the same company owns the "Great
White Fleet" of merchant vessels, 25,000 cattle, 17,000 horses, sugar mills, and rail-
roads. Barnes, supra at 32; THORP AND CROWDER, Op. cit. supra note 11, at 657. The
Glidden Company, formerly a maker of paint, studied its raw material, linseed oil; then
it developed the production of edible oils. Barnes, supra, at 30 et seq.
50. THORPu AND CROWDER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 602. As defined in the census
reports, by-products are not important from a revenue standpoint. Id. at 609. "Joint"
products are much more frequent than "by-products." Id. at 170. But the definition
of "by-product" requires it to be made in a separate plant. Id. at 174 et seq.
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by-products are important numerically. It follows that they may
assume a large quantitative role. Thus a recent annual report says:
In the early part of the century, Diamond acquired extensive
holdings of timber lands to provide reserves for the manufacture
of wood matches.
Research and experience have demonstrated that the most
efficient match production can be achieved by careful selection of
match lumber . . with the rest being sawed for building pur-
poses. . 5
An existing product may be converted to another purpose, thereby
enabling a producer to reach new markets. A photographic concern,
for example, now makes a device called "Recordak," a specialized
camera for use as a business machine.52 Changes in the basic product
have placed its maker in another "industry."
Existing technology may be applied to produce new devices. Thus
a dental manufacturing company entered the field of producing flexible
shafting for use upon automobiles, airplanes and other vehicles:
Experience in making flexible tubing for the dentist proved
valuable when industrial demand sprang up for similar products,
to which the company wisely and rather easily adjusted its sched-
ules. 3
Observers who find even the broad "chemical industry" narrower than
the field of endeavor of Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation have
been unable to discover a central theme for that concern's operations.
But one writer saw that the development of existing technology ac-
counted for the concern's wide diversification.54
51. ANN. REP., 1948, THE DIAMOND MATCH Co., at 5. With every ton of ore
extracted primarily for its nickel content, 95 pounds of copper are refined as opposed
to 47 pounds of nickel. Gold, silver, and platinum are also recovered. International
Nickel, Fortune, August 1934, pp. 64, 68. A concern extracting natural gas from the
ground derived 16.7% of its sales from the vending of gasoline. ANN. REP., 1948,
NATuRAL GAS PIPE LINE Co. OF AMERICA, at 10.
52. Richmond, Profits Out of Pictures, Magazine of Wall Street, Oct. 23, 1937,
pp. 24, 25. A machine used by farmers to spray crops was developed into a fog fire
fighter and also into a car-vash machine. Food Machinery Corp., A Saga in
Diversity, Business Week, April 10, 1948, pp. 88, 92. Cf. The Profits of Diversifica-
tion, Bus. Week, May 29, 1937, pp. 35, 41.
53. Barnes, supra note 49, at 31. See also Waldron, Coming Competitive Clash,
Magazine of Wall St., Nov. 9, 1946, pp. 127, 168; The Profits of Diversification, note
52 supra, at 39; Jordan, Profits from Diversification, Magazine of Wall St., Dec. 19,
1936, pp. 300, 301; Minnesota Mining in Motion, Fortune, Mar., 1949, pp. 93, 162;
American Smelting & Refining Ca., ANN. REP., 1948, at 16 et seq.
54. In Union Carbide I: The Corporation, Fortune, June 1941, p. 66 it is said:
"To define exactly what the nature of that business is has baffled almost everyone who
has tried it, including Union Carbide itself. It ranges through hundreds of seemingly
unrelated products. . . . It is merely bewildering . . . to look at this business as
a series of products or simply an expression of the American financial will to organize
. . . Carbide is neither a 'products' company nor a creation of Wall Street, but
primarily a process company built upon a few basic techniques ..
330 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
A desire for fuller use of existing tools and personnel may give
rise to diversification. At the end of World War I a powder company
had a large plant with excess capacity. Gradually it found uses for
its factories and tools in the production of soluble cotton for the lacquer,
photographic, coated fabric and plastic industries.55 A Wisconsin firm
makes an assortment of products which seem to bear little relationship
to each other. Among them are tanks for transport and storage; dump
bodies of various types; oil and gas fired home heating systems; farm
and industrial dehydration plants; milk bottle washers; and road mak-
ing machinery. It is nevertheless claimed that all of the products are
built with pre-existing tools.56 Even services made available to cor-
porations upon a permanent basis form a foundation for diversification.
A large concern may have departments specializing in accounting,
finance, law, advertising and the like. The existence of such services
may suggest the desirability of diversification.
57
Vertical integration may lead to entry into new fields. A tire
maker had a textile division to produce the cord and fabric needed in
its casings. When it converted from cotton to rayon tire cord, it was
left with excess textile capacity. Now it makes a branded dishcloth
in a part of the textile mills formerly producing tire cord.5" The United
Fruit Company started its radio business purely as a service to the
company's operations in the harvesting and shipment of bananas. It
now offers, through its subsidiary, Tropical Radio Telegraph Com-
pany, a general communications service to the public.59 United States
Steel Corporation originally got into the cement business in order to
afford an outlet for its slag. 0 Diversification is greatly encouraged by
operational changes in a vertically integrated business resulting in aban-
55. Clifford, Diversified outlets contribute to strong position, Magazine of Wall
Street, Nov. 20, 1937, p. 164. THORP and CROWDER, Op. cit. supra note 11, at 653.
56. Local needs influence product planning, Bus. Week, Aug. 14, 1948, pp. 44
et seq. Cf. The Profits of diversification, Bus. Week, May 29, 1937, pp. 35, 39.
57. Armstrong, Top management policies that speed healthy sales growth, Sales
Management, May 1, 1945, p. 35.
58. U.S. Rubber's two-way stretch, Bus. Week, Dec. 11, 1948, pp. 83, 88.
59. UNITED FRUIT Co., ANN. REP., 1948, at 22. The Fruit Company's fleet of
vessels now carries passengers as well as the company's own freight. Id,, at 23.
White Castle System, Inc., an operator of hamburger dispensaries, entered the produc-
tion of a prefabricated steel building which it made primarily for its own use. It also
made paper caps for its employees. Now both products are sold to others. The Profits
of diversification, supra note 56, at 40. Bethlehem builds ships, some of which carry
ore from its own mines to its own steel mills. BETHLEHEM STEEL CORP., ANN. REP.,
1948, at 6, 20. Use of diversification and vertical integration on a complementary
basis is illustrated in THE DIAMOND MATCH Co., ANN. REP., 1948, at 5.
60. U.S. Steel: I, Fortune, March 1936, pp. 59, 184. Vertical integration by the
major automobile manufacturers deprived some of the accessory producers of their
markets. They therefore turned to other fields. Applegate, Earning power of notor
accessory industry upheld by wide diversification, Annalist, Oct. 26, 1939, p. 531.
Vertical integration may also cause diversification when the acquired firm has a side-
line. THORP and CROWDER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 655. Foreclosure of mortgages
and similar operations may likewise result in diversification. Id. at 657.
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donment of a raw material. Thereafter it must be sold to some out-
sider or processed in a different manner."1
Sales promotion. As we have seen, diversification may result
from attempts to make use of existing facilities. Entrepreneurs may
also go into new lines of business as an attempt to improve sales of
their original products. Complementary merchandise is often produced
with such purposes in mind. Thus it has been said:
The Eastman Kodak Company makes cameras and, inciden-
tally, money on them. But it makes them mainly as a sideline
that photography may grow in popularity and usefulness and
thereby widen the demand for film.62
Public utilities engage in the sale of appliances which will utilize their
principal products.63 In some instances a manufacturer desires to pre-
serve the good will in the machinery he has sold by supplying articles
for use with it.6 4  In the General Motors case " the automobile manu-
facturer sought to justify its entry into the business of financing the
sale of cars by showing that the "unethical" practices of other financers
would hurt its good will. Indeed, it succeeded in showing that it had
originally entered the financing business almost wholly for the con-
venience of its customers. At that date there were scant other facili-
ties for the sale of automobiles "on time." 66
Sometimes the manufacturer wants to "round out his line" be-
cause the business policy of carrying "a full line" meets the convenience
of distributors or consumers. If important customers demand varied
items, a manufacturer or distributor may supply them.67  Since most
of the big buyers of steel require a variety of steel products, steel com-
61. THORP and CROWDER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 656.
62. Richmond, Profits out of pictures, Magazine of Wall Street, Oct. 23, 1937,
p. 24. Cf. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 15 F.2d 679
(4th Cir. 1926) cert. denied, 273 U.S. 757 (1927). American Can Company developed
machinery to sell cans in order to stimulate their use. Now it sells such machinery
to canners. AMERICAN CAN COMPANY, ANN. REP., 1948, at 246. A manufacturer of
sprayers went into the insecticide business in order to provide a product which could
be used with its original item. Food Machinery Corp.: A saga in diversity, Bus. Week,
April 10, 1948, pp. 88, 93.
63. About 8.65% of a utility's gross receipts were obtained from the sale of ap-
pliances and about 12% from the sale of by-products. PEoPLIs GAs LIGHT & COKE
COMPANY, 1948 ANN. REP., at 31.
64. THoRP' AND CROWDER, op. cit. supra note 49, at 652.
65. United States v. General Motors Corporation, 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
66. Id. at 386. As to another industry it has been said: "... it has been
recognized that, with a return to more normal conditions, the volume of time sales
would increase. . . . The Company must always be prepared to supplement existing
agencies in this financing to whatever extent may be required to obtain desirable
business. One method under consideration is the establishment of a subsidiary finance
company to assist in carrying out this function." INTERNATIONAL HARvEsTER COm-
PANY, 1948 ANN. REP. at 6.
67. THORP AND CROWDER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 651, 656.
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panies for years have set up their sales offices and trained their sales-
men to sell the whole line of products.6"
In other instances, additions to the sales "line" have been moti-
vated by a desire to economize. In other words, sales costs are heavy
and it is believed that they may successfully be spread over a larger
number of products to result in lower unit costs. Thus a glass com-
pany entered upon the manufacture of paint:
The production of these [paint] items on a large scale has
been logical because paint stores generally feature glass as well,
thus encouraging distribution of the dual line.69
In almost the converse situation a small firm may merge with a larger
one in order to secure the advantages of an existing system of distribu-
tion. 70  Of course diversification, in order to "round out" a "sales
line" and to reduce selling costs may be overdone. A firm with three
separate brands of the same item would seem to have carried the notion
into mere conglomeration for its own sake.7 ' Indeed, there are hints
that the attainment of "prestige" has had something to do with "round-
ing out the line." 72
Exploitation of the value of trade marks leads to sales diversifica-
tion. An interesting illustration is that of the Rieser Company, Inc.,
a concern engaged in the manufacture of "Venida" hair nets. During
the period 1922-1930, bobbed hair replaced earlier styles and the sales
68. U.S. Steel: I, Fortune, Mar. 1936, pp. 59, 184. As to the car-washer made
out of an insecticide sprayer, it has been said: "Food Machinery also converted the
basic sprayer into an efficient car casher. Selling it, though, wasn't so easy. Sales-
men reported they needed a broader line of automotive service equipment . . . so the
engineering department developed an auto wheel aligner and a wheel balancer. Now
all three items enjoy brisk demand." Food Machinery Corp.: A Saga in Diversity,
Bus. Week, Apr. 10, 1948, pp. 88, 92.
69. Barnes, supra note 49 at 31. Cf. Kelley, Chain store merchandising ideas
helped this little business grow, Sales Management, Aug. 1, 1945, pp. 103, 164, wherein
it was said: "At first glance, it might seem that Testor Chemical Co. has expanded
in a haphazard way. But upon analysis, it becomes evident that the expansion has
been along these lines: (1) as a result of intensive research into allied fields; (2) into
fields in which sales outlets have already been well established."
A manufacturer of candies added soft drinks, muffin mix, potato chips and other
foods because it was already distributing its wares to grocers. Schnering, Facts
Behind the Curtiss Candy Program of Line Expansion, Sales Management, Nov. 1,
1943, pp. 24, 25-26.
70. Philco Corporation, letter to stockholders (March 14, 1949) wherein the ac-
quisition by Philco of the assets of Electromaster, Inc., was described as follows:
"This transaction was a good one from the point of view of both companies. To the
Electromaster shareholders, it gave broader diversification through representation in
a number of different fields and the strength of the Philco distributor-dealer organiza-
tion. The acquisition of Electromaster enabled Philco to enter the electric range field
with an accepted product, modern plant facilities and a highly efficient organization.
To our former line of products . . . we have now added electric ranges, a field which
offers very attractive opportunities for growth and development."
A big firm may also acquire a smaller one to market some one product. Food
Machinery Corp.: A Saga in Diversity, Bus. Week, Apr. 10, 1948, pp. 88, 93.
71. ECKO PRODUCTS Co., ANN. REP., 1948, at 6.
72. Food Machinery Corp.: A Saga in Diversity, supra note 70, at 92.
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of hair nets declined drastically. The company thereupon entered into
the production of hair pins and allied products, such as shampoos, apply-
ing its trade mark to those new items. Diversification worked so well
that it later extended its line to include cleansing tissue.73 An officer of
the concern said:
Our purpose was to make a double play on our trade mark.
Identified with an established trade name, we felt that these two
products would benefit from an immediate acceptance. 4
Apparently makers of women's dresses are now entering the perfume
and cosmetic field. Manufacturers have decided to take advantage of
their names in the way it has been done in France. 5
Research and security. There are, of course, instances in which
diversification is a positive policy: it seeks additional profit rather
than negative elimination of waste. Many corporations, for example,
carry on a continuous program of industrial research. In studying one
problem, they often hit on variations which can be applied to create
new products.76 So intensive is the industrial research carried on by
some corporations that diversification flows in an unending stream.
One company sold nine million dollars worth of products in 1948, all
of which had been developed in its own laboratories within the two
previous years. 77  In 1937, 58% of the net income of a prominent
chemical manufacturer was derived from the sale of products devel-
oped in its own laboratories since 1919.78 Diversification results from
research because by-products are frequently more important than the
items sought. And since research is a deliberate policy, it must also be
considered that the diversification it causes is deliberate in character.79
73. Rieser, When Hair Nets Flopped, Printer's Ink, Jan. 24, 1935, pp. 56, 57.
74. Id. at 57. Concerning the venture of a miller in the home appliance field, it
has been said: "General Mills went into the appliance field partly because of Maurice
H. Graham, 59 year old inventor of the Toastmaster, whom it had retained in 1943.
His first idea: Capitalize on Betty Crocker's famous name. The upshot came in
1946; The Betty Crocker Tru-Heat Iron." Diversification Pays Off, Bus. Week, Feb.
28, 1948, pp. 66, 74. A survey showed that General Mills' trade mark was known
to 91% of all housewives. Id. at 76.
75. In some instances trade marks have been broadcast over unrelated products.
Fairbanks, Morse Steps Out, Bus. Week, Apr. 28, 1934, p. 10 (Maker of scales added
windmills, gas engines, pumps, radios, washing machines, refrigerators). Cf. the case
in which a company starts to produce its old product from a wholly new raw material.
TEXAS GULF SULPHUR COMPANY, ANN. REP., 1948, at 3.
76. THORP' AND CROWDER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 648; ABBOTT LABORATORIES,
ANN. REP., 1948, at 3.
77. MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING COMPANY, ANN. REP., 1948, at 10.
78. Devlin, Making Diversification Pay, Magazine of Wall Street, Nov. 5, 1938,
p. 88. CELANESE CORPORATION OF A.ERICA, ANN. REP., 1948, at 18.
79. GENERAL MILLS, INC., 20TH ANN. REP., May 31, 1948, p. 34, wherein it is
said: "The research philosophy of General Mills is summed up in the words of James
F. Bell: 'You can influence research environmentally, but you cannot lead it. You
must follow where research leads.'"
In General Mills' Horizons, Feb. 1949, p. 9 it was said: "We see no good reason
for limiting ourselves to food products. Our research explores possibilities in many
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Deliberate adoption of diversification also occurs when a company
is concerned that a substitute product may capture its market. When
can companies started to market special cans for beer, a prominent
maker of glass beer bottles jumped into the business of making tin con-
tainers.80 As Professor Burns said, integration into substitute products
starts with a desire to reduce risks. The firm is impelled to enter the
production of goods and services likely to displace its existing prod-
ucts."' And to a certain extent the production of substitutes is akin
to the broadening of trade marks to cover new products.
Stabilization. Perhaps more important is the effort to stabilize
business. Diversification has long been urged as a means of avoiding
both seasonal and cyclical slumps in sales. To avoid the seasonal char-
acter of the ice trade, a prominent corporation went into the business
of selling coal and oil.8" A manufacturer of Christmas tree lights, sold
only in the holiday season, expanded its output so as to produce stoves,
refrigerators, freezers, kitchen cabinets, automobile lamps and explo-
sives.83 Efforts to bridge gaps of the business cycle are perhaps even
more important as a cause of diversification than efforts to avoid sea-
sonal slumps. Many of the depression troubles of a prominent maker
of electrical equipment were blamed upon its concentration in producers'
goods. It was suggested that the concern diversify so as to make
radios, refrigerators and other items sold directly to ultimate con-
sumers.
84
Imperceptibly a desire to stabilize may become an urge to allocate
resources into greener pastures. As the demand for cigars declined, a
fields. * . . Research led us into the chemical field where we are now extracting
and processing oils. We believe that diversification will assist us in building a stronger
and better company."
80. The Profits of Diversification, Bus. Week, May 29, 1937, pp. 35, 40. Cf.
Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Quinby, 137 Fed. 882, 896 et seq. (7th Cir. 1905).
81. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION, 454 (1936).
82. City Ice Diversifies, Bus. Week, May 18, 1946, p. 73; Donaven, We Are
Stabilizing Employment, 92 Factory Management and Maintenance, Nov. 1934, pp.
480, 481.
83. Santa Claus Diversifies, Bus. Week, Dec. 28, 1946, pp. 56, 60. The Profits of
Diversification, Bus. Week, May 29, 1937, pp. 35, 39. Gates, Diversity of Output the
Key to Recovery, Magazine of Wall Street, Jan. 5, 1935, pp. 328, 329. Other examples
are found in Diversification Smooths Cycle of National Acme, Barron's, March 21,
1949, p. 35, 135. Gillette Begins to Diversify, Bus. Week, Jan. 10, 1948, p. 44. On
the other hand, Thorp found the trend toward diversification stronger during the
period 1920-1933 than during the period 1933-1939. THORP AND CROWDER, Op. cit.
supra note 11, at 660. He also pointed out that the cause of diversification does not
necessarily indicate why a firm selects a particular new product. Id. at 646. See also
Ex-CEL.o-O-Co,., ANN. REP., at 4 (1942).
84. Efforts are frequently made to depart from the production of highly cyclical
producers' goods into the making of consumers' goods. Baird, Wider Line of Products
Pulls Evans Out of the Red, Sales Management, Feb. 15, 1934, p. 135. (Concern
making product to load automobiles on railway cars turned to manufacture of sepa-
rators for automobile batteries; etc.) ; The Profits of Diversification, Bus. Week,
May 29, 1937, p. 38; Stern, Borg-Warner Makes Diversification Pay, Magazine of
Wall Street, July 18, 1936, p. 409.
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tobacco manufacturer went into the wine business.8 5 When air con-
ditioning was first introduced, many existing concerns, including two
automobile manufacturers, 8 hastened to enter the new field. A desire
to get in on the ground floor of a new industry s7 and the urge to avoid
rigorously competitive markets are both factors to be considered.'
An important maker of radio sets went into the refrigerator and air
conditioning business because profit margins on its existing production
were low. 9
Multiple causes for diversification. It must be plain that more
than one of the foregoing factors may be a simultaneous cause for
diversification. For example, a prominent maker of matches also
makes and sells toothpicks, paper towels and other paper products.
They are made out of the same raw material as matches and are sold
through the same channels.9" An amusing case which rings almost all
the changes upon the asserted virtues of diversification is that of Globe
Union, Inc., formerly a maker of batteries for farm, automobile and
radio use. Its expansion into new lines of production was explained
in the following terms:
It was decided to seek additional lines which would tend to
level out production and steadily employ our . . . equipment.
Because [facilities were available] . . . we took on the manu-
facture of spark plugs. Spark plugs are 'distributed through the
same channels as automotive batteries and the demand is fairly
constant. With punch-press and screw machine equipment avail-
able, we further diversified by adding roller skates, the sale of
which is in seasonal peaks opposite from battery peaks. Develop-
ment of roller skates led to making a beginner's ice skate and later
a roller scooter set (all of which fit into toy and sporting goods
markets). Our automotive lines require manufacture of other
85. The Profits of Diversification, Bus. Week, May 29, 1937, pp. 35, 37.
86. Id. at 37.
87. Id. at 37.
88. Minvesota Mining in Motion, Fortune, March, 1949, pp. 93, 162.
89. Philco Diversifies, Bus. Week, March 18, 1949, p. 23; Diversification Pays
Off, Bus. Week, Feb. 28, 1948, pp. 66, 68. It is said that General Mills makes a low
margin of profit on flour milling and it is attempting to improve its position by
diversification into packaging machines, vitamin concentrates, household appliances,
refineries for soybean oil, fatty acids, farm feeds, etc. Id. at 66 et seq. A revealing
statement is that of the American Brake Shoe Company: "Over a period of years, we
have been following the policy in our foundry Divisions of adapting a substantial part
of their capacity to the production of more specialized and complex products. This has
been done to achieve a more balanced output between the standard foundry items and
special products." AmERcAN BRAKE SHOE Co., ANN. REP., 1948, at 15.
90. THE DIAMOND MATCH Co., ANN. REP., 1948, at 5. In December 1948 the
McGraw Electric Company acquired two other concerns: "This acquisition had a
double objective. The first was to diversify our company's position and amplify its
scope of operation. The second was to avoid current excessive building and equip-
ment costs for major plant expansion by acquiring profitable going concerns .
both badly needed to round out our company's line of small electrical appliances... .
McGRAv ELECnc Co., ANN. REP., 1948, at 2.
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items, such as battery test equipment, spark plug testing and clean-
ing equipment and spark plug gap gages. 91
Effect of political forces; involuntary diversification. Some diver-
sification results from forces beyond the control of corporate manage-
ment. Indeed, there are causes of diversification which are non-
economic in character. Take, for example, the effect of war. Many
corporations expanded their plants in order to take war contracts.
After hostilities ceased, the entrepreneurs sought uses for the additional
plant.92 In the period following World War II many makers of air-
craft expanded into new lines of product. One, for example, despite
the unfavorable experiences of its competitors, branched out into the
refrigerator business.93 Machine tool manufacturers also have been
compelled to find uses for excess capacity born of war necessity. 94 Once
war has caused the creation of excess capacity, the resultant diversifi-
cation is simply a question of making that fuller use of facilities sug-
gested above. Political considerations may also suggest the desirability
of engaging in new enterprises using raw materials produced by large
voting blocs.95
Impact of taxtion. Another important political cause of diversifi-
cation is found in the federal tax structure. At the present time the
combination of normal and surtaxes results in a 38% direct levy upon
corporate earnings.9 6 At the same time rates on individual incomes
are steeply graduated. An individual with $2,000 of income pays 19%
on additional earnings. Over $8,000 the rate is 31%; over $16,000
91. The Profits of Diversification, supra note 85, at 38.
92. Munitions Makers Venture Into New Lines to Use War Plants and Experi-
ence, Barron's July 9, 1945, p. 1. A builder of battleships went into the automobile
and radio business. Ibid.
93. Hellman, Bell Aircraft Would Take on New Lines, Barron's, Apr. 18, 1949,
p. 41. Cf. Waldron, Coming Competitive Clash, Magazine of Wall Street, Nov. 9,
1946, p. 127. Pressed Steel Car Co., a railway equipment manufacturer, expanded
into the production of household appliances, air conditioning, and refrigerators. Note
92 supra.
94. THE WARNER & SWASEY Co., ANN. REP., 1948, at 3: "... we have been
undertaking the conversion of a part of our operations to the manufacture of products
other than machine tools. This is in line with our long-range program for the
utilization of added plant and equipment acquired during the war." General Mills
expanded its machine shop in wartime and now makes machinery for printers, can-
making equipment and the like. Barnes, What's in a name? Magazine of Wall
Street, April 12, 1947, p. 30.
95. GENERAL MILLS, INC., 16th ANN. REP., 1944 at 4: "Several important new
products will come in a relatively new field, that of the non-food use of agricultural
products. Finding new industrial uses for farm products is an avowed research
project for General Mills . . . Extension of activities into the non-food uses of
agricultural products bears promise of future benefit to the company. It will also
help to create a more stable market for the farmer, give him a greater return for his
investment of capital and labor, and help to maintain his buying and producing
power.'
96. INT. REV. CODE §§ 13, 15. Nelson, Double taxation legal but unfair, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1949, § 3, p. 1, col. 4.
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the rate is 47%; and above $44,000 the personal tax is 69%.11 Com-
putation shows that the effective rate of total tax on dividends in the
lowest bracket is about 49.8%. If the shareholder already has in-
come of $8,000, a similar computation shows the effective rate of tax
to be about 57.2%. With income over $16,000, the effective rate
rises to 67.1% and when the shareholder already has $44,000 of in-
come, his dividend is taxed at 80.7%. Even if the earnings of the
corporation can somehow be transmuted into capital gains of a long
term variety, the shareholder will still pay 25% of his dividends out
in tax. 8  Accordingly, the effective rate of taxation upon the cor-
porate earnings will be above 50%
Another tax factor which may bear on the popularity of diversifi-
cation is the limitation upon deductions for capital losses.99 A going
concern may be able to absorb a considerable expenditure for develop-
ing new products against its current gross receipts. If an individual
subscribes to stock in a new venture, he will receive only $1,000 of
tax benefit against ordinary income in the event of total loss.
Stiff penalties are attached to the accumulation of corporate earn-
ings beyond the needs of the business." ° It can hardly be imagined,
however, that the tremendous burdens imposed on shareholders in the
declaration of dividends are overlooked. If the corporation can rein-
vest the earnings with any profitability whatsoever, the result will al-
most inevitably be advantageous to the shareholders.
Such taxation encourages debt financing. When taxes are steeply
"progressive" return from investment becomes less important. Inves-
tors prefer to avoid risks and seek the shelter of bonds, particularly
those which are tax-exempt. There is reason to believe that the cur-
rent rate of taxation has so depressed equity values as to make the
acquisition of going concerns cheaper than new construction. 1°1 In
1948 and 1949 it was not uncommon for one corporation to acquire
another for less than the reproduction cost of its tangible plant after
97. INT. REV. CODE § 12.
98. INT. REV. CODE §§ 117(a), 117(b).
99. INT. REV. CODE §§23(g) (1), 117(d) (2).
100. INT. REv. CODE § 102. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.102-3 (1943) provides:
"An accumulation of earnings or profits . . . is unreasonable if it is not required for
the purposes of the business . . . The business of a corporation is not merely that
which it has previously carried on, but includes in general any line of business which
it may undertake. However, a radical change of business when a considerable surplus
has been accumulated may afford evidence of a purpose to avoid the surtax . . ."
101. McGRAw ELEcTRIC Co., ANN. REP., 1948, at 2. Cf. Adams, How low-or
high--are stock prices? Taxes spell the answer, Chicago Journal of Commerce, May
9, 1949, p. 1, col. 3-7. Deductibility of interest is another factor which may be im-
portant. INT. REv. CODE § 23(b). Taxation also affects a concerns ability to ex-
tricate itself from diversification. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has insisted
that distribution of General Motors stock to DuPont shareholders would constitute
taxable income both to the corporation and to its stockholders. Damned both ways,
Fortune, Feb., 1949, p. 15.
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depreciation. Perhaps current rates of federal income taxation are
encouraging dissipation of capital: those whose savings would nor-
mally be available for equity financing may be spending their principal.
If that is true, the supply side of the market has been augmented, forc-
ing values down. Whatever the cause, depressed equity values may
encourage diversification rather than expansion of current production
because the acquired concern's products are rarely identical with those
of the purchaser. And it is worth noting that the Internal Revenue
Code does not discourage the formation of subsidiary corporations.
Eighty-five per cent of the dividends received by one corporation from
a domestic corporation subject to tax are credits to the taxpaying stock-
holder." 2
BENEFITS OF DIVERSIFICATION
In the foregoing survey an attempt has been made to discover
the origins of diversification. In many instances it would seem that
additional products had been added mainly to reduce costs. In other
cases a more positive effort to create additional earnings can be dis-
cerned as a motivating force. Involuntary diversification may be caused
by political factors, among which the impact of federal taxation is per-
haps the most important.
Some of the forms of diversification thus adopted are clearly
beneficial to the economy as a whole. In the first place, certain efficien-
cies undoubtedly result from the production or distribution of several
products. 0 3 Such full utilization of raw materials as is encompassed
in the production of by-products seems almost certain to avoid waste.
0 4
Similarly, distribution of several products through the same channels
has afforded enough customer convenience to assure the success of
mail order houses and department stores. Some types of diversifica-
tion resulting from vertical integration may cause substantial savings
and if we were to forbid the use of existing technology in new ways, we
should prevent firms from making full use of their real assets (despite
the fact that the balance sheet does not show them). Even apart from
economies within a plant, diversification may be efficient. Thus use of
102. INT. REV. CODE §26(b). But cf. § 117(d) (1) (corporations not even allowed
$1,000 capital loss against ordinary income).
103. THORP AND CROWDER, Op. cit. supra note 11, at 178. Even within a single
plant, diversification may produce economy. Id. at 663.
104. Cf. Attorney General v. Pere Marquette Railway Co., 263 Mich. 431, 248
N.W. 860 (1933) (surplus property may be used without violation of doctrine of ultra
vires). As for the necessity of diversification to create new products, compare
Conant, One or vany lines? Barron's, July 8, 1940, p. 7, where it is said: "There
must be fairly constant input into a business against the ravages of fading-out demand.
• . .We cannot get all set on our favorite product and sink or swim on that alone.
Sooner or later it may get water-logged and fail to keep us afloat. We cannot hope
always to find intimately related lines in which to expand. We may have to seek
new trade entirely . . .
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similar tools to produce commodities varied by the season may cut
costs '05 and it is also possible that the element of transportation charges
will create a similar effect.106 As we have seen, some firms are spread-
ing services over a large number of products. Legal, financial and
marketing services may be allocated to a number of different com-
modities in an effort to reduce overhead costs. 0 7  Of course all the
foregoing considerations scarcely apply to concerns producing wholly
unrelated products." 8
One school of thought favors the spreading of risks. Andrew
Carnegie, on the other hand, was quoted as urging businessmen to put
all their eggs in one basket and to watch the basket. Those two di-
vergent theories may be compared to the views that experience is the
most important factor in business success 109 and its opposite, the
belief that intelligence, industry and judgment will produce favorable
results in any field. It is difficult to suggest any test of efficiency in
the varying degrees of diversification. Every change is likely to in-
crease some costs as it decreases others. In other words, efficiency is
a question of balance which can only be ascertained, if at all, from a
study of practical effects. It is sometimes said that the United States
Steel Corporation is so large that it is inefficient. As evidence of such
inefficiency, it is shown that the company has progressively lost part of
105. THORP AND CROWDER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 664.
106. If freight costs are high, diversification may become efficient even though
specialization within the plant would otherwise be more desirable. Diversification can
result in greater production and better -market coverage, Brick & Clay Record, July
1944, p. 18.
107. In the period 1935-1945 American Home Products Corporation added 27
formerly independent concerns to its assets. Each former concern enjoys considerable
independence. As to various services, however, it was said: ". . . all subsidiaries,
while exercising a wide degree of autonomy, share in and may draw upon a vast
pool of marketing experiences, and top-flight talent to expedite any program or assist
with any problem. Greater benefits through research and economies in production
and distribution are thus realized . . ." Armstrong, Top management policies that
speed healthy sales growth, Sales Management, May 1, 1945, p. 35. An interesting
statement of a similar situation concerning a firm called Continental Industries is
found in Strength in unity: Continental Industries is uniting well-established small
businesses, Bus. Week, Oct. 7, 1944, p. 66.
108. Cf. Daly, Cotton and woolen mills in big merger, Manufacturers' Record,
Oct. 1946, p. 69 (assertion that merger of cotton, woolen and rayon mills was ex-
pected to effect operating economies). And spreading of common costs may give rise
to difficulties. Burns, THE DECLINE or CoMPETITION 450 (1936). Cf. the con-
troversy concerning the allocation of costs within the Tennessee Valley Authority.
By allocating a large part of the capital expense to flood control, navigation, etc., it is
possible to reduce the "cost" of electricity to a low level. Roberts, Certain Aspects
of Power Irrigation and Flood Control Projects, TAsK FORCE REPORT TO COMISSION
ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT 15 et seq. (1949).
But cf. Acheson et al. dissenting in Hoover (Ch.), ComMIssion ON ORGANIZATION OF
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, REORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL BusiNEss ENTER-
PRIsE 106 et seq. (1949) (denial of assertion that costs should be allocated upon
economic basis). See text infra, at notes 197-207.
109. The late J. 0. McKinsey, an efficiency expert called to the chairmanship of
Marshall Field and Company, was quoted as favoring concentration of that firm's
endeavors within narrow limits. Acting upon that theory, the company sold another
department store which it operated and reduced its wholesale business. Field sells a
store, Bus. Week, May 29, 1937, p. 34.
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its market to smaller rivals. Such a concern faces a difficult problem
when it is tempted to expand into a new field of endeavor." 0
Another important benefit of diversification is that it increases
competition. Entry of the Chrysler Corporation into the air condi-
tioning business must have stiffened competition in that industry more
than the creation of a new firm would have done."' Professor Edwards
took account of this favorable aspect of diversification." 2  As Thorp
said, "mobility is increased," i. e., resources are rapidly shifted to more
economic uses." 3 And he found that half of the companies studied
which diversified into new products created new facilities to do so: there
was not merely a change of ownership resulting in aggrandizement of
an existing concern."
4
It seems likely that diversification adds to the stability of individual
firms. Avoidance of seasonal patterns of business, for example, would
seem to reduce risks of failure. Similarly, the circumvention of cyclical
fluctuation must tend to preserve existing concerns from the grasp
of banlkruptcy."' There is, of course, a tremendous variation in the
110. U.S. Steel: I., Fortune, March, 1936, p. 59. U.S. Steel: Into Cheinicals?
Bus. Week, Apr. 10, 1948, p. 30. It is often said that a specialized concern can operate
more efficiently than its diversified competitor. "Many large companies attained their
greatest growth, in other words became big, when they were one-line businesses . . .
Bigness gave them greater diversity and strength, but it also gave them disadvantages
which they did not have when they were small. The company with a small line of
products can throw all its resources into making that line profitable. It has nothing
else to worry about. Often the large company has to scatter its efforts over so many
activities that on the average only some of these activities result in a profit. Other
activities pile up losses that partly or entirely offset the profits being made in some
divisions." Murphy, The Simple Business Is Best, Barron's, Jan. 8, 1940, p. 7. In
the last analysis the problem is undoubtedly one of balance.
111. THORP AND CROWDER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 668 et seq.; Ways to skin a
cat, Bus. Week, Nov. 24, 1934, p. 12.
112. Edwards, An Appraisal of the Antitrust Laws, 36 PROC. Am. EcoN. AssN.
172, 187 note 1 (1946). An interesting statement has been made concerning the
introduction of the insecticide D.D.T.: "Many [chemical] firms hastened to make the
remarkable insecticide DDT when it first appeared on the market. It wasn't long
before supplies were more than adequate and the price came down. Only a few big
firms with favorable costs . . . fared well in the final accounting." Self, Soft Spots
and Competition Appear in Chemical Sales, Barron's, Apr. 25, 1949, p. 9. Cf.
Conant, THE INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO. 189 (1913).
113. THORP AND CROWDER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 669 et seq. Sometimes ex-
clusive dealing arrangements are defended upon the grounds that they are necessary
to give a dealer an incentive to buck an established monopoly. See the statement of
Senator Walsh, 15 Cong. Rec. 14,097, 14,098 (August 21, 1914).
114. THoRP AND CROWDER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 661.
115. Burns, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 450 (1936); Stabilizing the Brass
Business, Fortune, July 1949, p. 70; Bowen, Big Chemical Companies Outwit Busi-
ness Decline, Barron's, Nov. 14, 1949, p. 11. As to cyclical changes, compare the
following statement: "When a specialized enterprise is caught with a product for
which the demand is disappearing, its demise is ait to lead to a definite break in
employment both of men and machines. In the case of the large multi-product enter-
prise, on the other hand, there is more likelihood, though no certainty, that the
transition can be carried out in an orderly way with a maximum of salvage." THom
AND CROWDER, op. cit. mpra note 11, at 665. Professor Dewing, on the other hand,
was more than skeptical of industrial consolidations as a means of warding off de-
pressions. DEwiNG, THE FINANCIAL POLIcY OF CORPORATIONS 765 (3d ed. 1934).
He said: "And, as in the earlier periods of the eighteen nineties, the professional
economists acquiesced in the presumption that combinations were a means of sup-
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cyclical patterns of different industries. For example, the 1932 pro-
duction of steel rails was only 14.7%o of the 1929 figure, but in 1932
the tobacco companies produced about 93%o' of the cigarettes they had
rolled in 1929.116 A concern with a foot in each industry, therefore,
would seem to be less vulnerable to cyclical hazards than one wholly
concentrated in the less stable business.
To the extent that each firm is more stable it would seem likely that
employment would fluctuate less. And if machines and inventories are
not dumped on markets at distress sales, prices generally would be less
likely to swing between extreme positions. Thus it can be argued
that stabilization of individual firms results in stabilization of the
economy as a whole. The fact that underdeveloped areas of the world
are constantly striving toward diversified production lends credence to
that conclusion.lla
ATTACKS AND ANALYSIS
If the above outline of the causes and benefits of diversification is
sound, we shall be better able to appraise the complaints against diver-
sification set forth below---complaints which relate to the existence of
alleged monopoly. The charges set forth do not, however, include
pressing competition, so now the contemporary theoretical students see in the con-
tinued merging of corporations a groping after stability. But one set of phrases
cannot be substituted for another in the hope of discovering a new truth . ..nor can
we presume that a stability arising from the presumption that the larger the unit of
production or distribution, the greater its vitality, has any lasting reality as an
abiding economic truth. Economic laws are made of more robust stuff." As an
abstract ideal, bankruptcy may suggest desirable fluidity but in the absence of perfect
competition, the losses inherent in bankruptcy are probably real. In addition, there
are court costs and delays which can hardly contribute to increased production. It is
interesting to note that the courts have usually been wary of giving the mortgagee his
pound of flesh. Even in the most obvious cases, the courts have not always squeezed
out common stockholders in corporate reorganizations. See Dodd, The Los Angeles
Lumber Products Company Case and Its Implications, 53 HAav. L. REv. 713, 734
et seq. (1940). Apparently there is a feeling that the business cycle swings away
from "fair" values.
The Gillette Company, which purchased the "Toni" hair waving business in order
to diversify its activities and thus avoid cyclical changes, recently reported a decline
in its overall profits owing to slack sales of "Toni" products and not to lack of profits
in the original razor blade business. Gillette ready to ship new product, Boston Trav-
eler, May 19, 1949, p. 40, col. 5.
116. CHICAGO DAILY NEws, ALMANAC 115, 266 (1931); 366, 679 (1934). Of
course diversification reduces high earnings in boom times as much as it protects
corporate existence during depressions. That fact is recognized by industry. Thus
it has been said: "General American will continue to build toward making its business
more and more depression-resistant, sacrificing, where necessary, quick profits to
gain that end. The leasing business, the backgone of your Company's stable earnings,
is expanding on a sound basis. In addition, our diversification in manufacturing makes
possible for us sharply increased earnings. That should result in periods of good
business activity." GENERAL AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, ANN. REP.
FOR 1947 at 3. The question might well be asked why firms do not hoard cash during
boom times instead of diversifying into new products.
117a. Hutcheson, Problems of the Underdeveloped Countries-I, 24 Foreign Pol.
Reps., Sept. 15, 1948, p. 98. Note also that farmers are constantly urged to diversify
their crops so as to reduce dependence upon a single commodity.
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every conceivable argument against the multi-product firm: only the
more important grounds of attack are considered. After each follows
an analysis of its validity.
Tying clauses. One of the chief complaints against diversification
is that it leads to the "tying" of one product to another. (Sometimes
the phrase "full line forcing" is used instead of "tying.") It is alleged
that the diversified manufacturer pre-empts the dealers' shelves. The
maker of a single product, even if it is better or cheaper, cannot secure
a market. n b
In the pre-war assault upon General Motors," 8 the theory that
diversification leads to tying was not advanced in those terms. But
such a theory was implied. In that case it appeared that General
Motors, a manufacturer of automobiles, had several wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries. Among them were General Motors Sales Corporation
(GMSC) and General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC).
GMSC was merely an agent for the parent in making the original sales
of cars to dealers. GMAC extended credit both to dealers buying from
GMSC and to ultimate consumers buying from dealers. Some 375
independent finance companies competed with GMAC. A system of
making payment for automobiles on the part of the dealers was so ar-
ranged as to favor GMAC: an officer of GMSC held agency powers
from each dealer so that he might execute appropriate notes to GMAC.
As applied to sales from dealers to consumers, the evidence showed
that dealers who failed to use the GMAC service were in danger of
losing their "franchises." In other words, General Motors would not
sell automobiles unless the dealers compelled consumers to purchase
through GMAC. Oddly enough, however, it was found that only 75%
of the dealers were utilizing the GMAC service.
Nowhere in the Attorney General's brief nor in the opinion is it
suggested that the mere combination of making motor cars and ex-
tending credit to purchasers thereof violated the Sherman Act. Ap-
parently the lack of prior authority caused avoidance of that position.
Instead, the whole case was predicated on the theory that General
Motors "coerced" the dealers into using GMAC financing. Thus
the court said:
When the evidence is boiled down, it is seen at once that
the appellants agreed among themselves not to do business with
any dealer who would not purchase the retail and wholesale serv-
ice from GMAC. . . In the usual case the recalcitrant dealer
117b. RAYMOND, THE LIMITIST 35 (1947). Cf. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COM-
PETITION: REQUISITES OF A GOVERNMENTAL POLICY 104 (1949).
118. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
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had become firmly established in his community and was operating
a profitable business, when he was given the ultimatum either to
use GMAC or to liquidate his business.i"
Although every dealer is an independent business man, the
supervision and control exercised by GMAC and GMSC over
his business operations is almost as complete as if the dealer were
an agent in all respects. Every dealer also acquires a substantial
investment in buildings, cars, parts and accessories, and builds up
good will in his community. Consequently, a cancelled dealership
leaves the appellants with one less retail outlet which can be re-
placed readily, but leaves the disenfranchised dealer without a busi-
ness and burdened with his substantial investment in the liquida-
tion of which he is likely to sustain a heavy loss.
120
Conspiracy between GMC and its two subsidiaries was the founda-
tion of the case, although some stress was laid upon the power of
General Motors as an important producer of automobiles:
Not only is market control present in the instant case, but a
peculiarly pernicious form of it is exhibited.
This becomes apparent at once when it is observed that
GMC occupies a dominant position in the automobile indus-
try. . 121
The court concluded:
. . . The necessary and inevitable effect of the coercive
conduct tended to produce two distinct restraints of trade, namely
a restraint on the commerce in General Motors cars and a restraint
on the commerce in instruments of credit.
122
As every lawyer knows, the practice of tying is prohibited by
section 3 of the Clayton Act.2 3  And recently the decisions have
tended to apply the terms of that prohibition stringently." 4  They have
suggested that foreclosure from any "substantial market" would bring
section 3 of the Clayton Act into play.125  Possibly the "substantial
market" may consist only of the defendant's own sales. When a pat-
entee has attempted to tie an unpatented item to his patented product,
119. Id. at 399.
120. Id. at 398.
121. Id. at 403.
122. Id. at 399. For further history of the automobile finance cases see Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303, 306, 312 (1948).
123. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 USC § 14 (1946). The authorities up to 1940 are
collected in Hale, Control Over Distribution, 14 Miss. L.J. 170, 177 et seq. (1942).
124. Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936).
125. Note, Tying Restrictions: Changing Standards of Legality, 48 COL. L. Rxv.
733, 740 (1948).
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the arrangement has been treated with special severity. Ever since the
motion picture patents case 128 a patentee has been held powerless to
compel his licensee to purchase unpatented supplies for use in the pat-
ented machine. In fact recent decisions have gone to the extreme of
refusing to enforce any rights in a patent if a tying clause is used in
connection therewith.1
2 7
Analysis of tying clauses. It has been suggested-although pos-
sibly only indirectly-that diversification results in the "tying" of one
product to another. In other words, it is urged that tying clauses
are an inevitable concomitant of diversification. Certainly, full line
forcing and similar practice may result from diversification,22 and, of
course, cannot exist without it. An officer of a prominent farm equip-
ment manufacturer was once quoted as saying that his company's policy
did not favor full line forcing. He admitted, however, that his sales-
men had to be dissuaded from the practice.' And there is something
to be said for the view that sellers will take every advantage they can
and hence will tie one product to another whenever that is possible.
Perhaps Professor Levi had such a thought in mind when he suggested
that integration would always lead to abuses.' 0
On the other hand, there is considerable weakness in any argu-
ment that diversification inevitably leads to tying. In the first place,
the process of "rounding out the line" is not the same as "full line
forcing." The former is undertaken on behalf of the customer. Thus
in the postscript to the Standard Oil decision whereby Socony was per-
mitted to merge with Vacuum, the court declared:
126. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917).
127. Note 125 supra at 739. But cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253
U.S. 421, 427 (1920), where it was said: "The words 'unfair method of competition'
• . . are clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as opposed to
good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression, or as
against public policy because of their dangerous tendency to hinder competition or
create monopoly."
Arguments against the "tying" of one good to another are found in United Shoe
Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 457 (1922); Mr. Justice Brandeis,
dissenting in Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 440 (1920) ; STEVENS,
UNFAIR COMPETITION 75 (1917) ; Senator Reed, 51 CONG. REc. 14,091, 14,097 (August
21, 1914); Stockhausen, The Commercial and Anti-trust Aspects of Term Require-.
r-eits Contracts, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 412, 421 (1948); Lewis, Motion Pictures, 11
ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 58, 62 (1933) ; SEN. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 et seq.
(1914). There is, of course, an active question as to what constitutes a tied contract
as opposed to a combination sale. Note 125 supra, at 742. Similarly the distinction
between tying clauses and "full line forcing" is vague. Cf. DAVIES, TRUST LAWS AND
UNFAIR COMIPETITION 322 (1915).
128. CONANT, THE INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO. 308 (1913).
129. Ibid.
130. Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 153, 180
(1947). Cf. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 15 F.2d 679
(4th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 757 (1927) with U.S. v. General Motors Corp.,
121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). If coercion is the
natural and inevitable consequence of diversification, it would be difficult to reconcile
the two foregoing decisions.
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The struggle for this trade made the pleasure of that cus-
tomer worthwhile, and such pleasure and convenience soon directed
that he be able to procure oil at the same place and time that he
bought gasoline. 131
In other words, the consumer requests the manufacturer to "round out
the line" for the former's convenience. "Full line forcing," on the
other hand, is usually described as a program to compel a distributor
to take merchandise he does not want. Surely there is some incon-
sistency between the repeated stress laid upon "full line forcing" and
the fact that "rounding out the line" is frequently undertaken at the
insistence of the dealer.3 Although this analysis may not apply
equally to all dealers and may be adversely affected by the passage of
time, it would nevertheless seem that "rounding out the line" would, to
a degree, cancel out the argument based upon "full line forcing."
In the second place, it will be remembered that "rounding out the
line" is by no means the only cause of diversification. Take, for exam-
ple, the case of complementary goods. A complementary product may
be used as part of a tying scheme.' 3 On the other hand, it is often
provided for the convenience of the customer. It may be a trade neces-
sity arising out of a time lag. When the motive is the convenience
of the customer, it scarcely seems possible that tying can be objection-
able. A similar argument can be applied to General Motors as a
financier of the sale of its automobiles.3 4 A railroad which builds a
resort hotel along its lines so as to attract passenger traffic can scarcely
be said to have created an objectionable monopoly. 3 5
A more important factor arises out of the fact that diversification
does not always lead to sales in the same market. Thorp and Crowder
broke their analysis of diversification down into three principal cate-
gories. Those categories were divergent functions, convergent func-
tions and unrelated functions. Under divergent functions they listed
joint products, by-products and like processes. Under convergent func-
tions they listed complementary products, auxiliary products and goods
made to sell in like markets. 36 In other words, they distinguished di-
131. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 47 F.2d 288, 300 (E.D. Mo. 1931).
132. Possibly "rounding out the line" may be overemphasized. Thus it has been
said: ". . . it may be necessary to sell some articles at a loss in order to offer a'complete line' to the customer so that he will buy other articles on which a satis-
factory profit is earned . . . It is sometimes necessary to follow this plan, but sales
departments are likely to over-emphasize the necessity." McKINsEY, BusiNEss
ADMINISTRATION 138 (1924).
133. THoRP AND CROWDFR, op. cit. supra note 11, at 652.
134. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
135. Jacksonville Railway v. Hooper, 160 U.S. 514, 523 (1896).
136. THORP AND CROWDER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 146. The definitions of these
authors should be examined with care. Id. at 147, 149.
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versification arising out of economies in production from diversifica-
tion aimed at the process of distribution. When functions are "diver-
gent" the products end up in different markets. When functions are
"convergent" goods made from varying materials are sold through the
same channels. It must be plain that there can be no tying of products
when the diversification is of the divergent type. Compare, for exam-
ple, the first Shoe Machinery case .. with the present situation of the
International Harvester Company. All of the products of the United
Shoe Machinery Company were sold to shoemakers. Thus it was pos-
sible to require the customers to take all or none of the manufacturer's
products. International Harvester Company sells its trucks chiefly to
industry. Its agricultural implements are sold principally to farmers.
13 8
The Harvester Company can scarcely be accused of tying the sales of
motor trucks to its farm implement business.
Another important factor relates to the existence of some element
of monopoly in the principal product to which the ancillary commodity
is "tied." In the absence of such an element the two items cannot
be tied together. 3 9 On the New York Stock Exchange, for example,
a seller cannot insist that a buyer take a hundred shares of Standard
Oil when he purchases a hundred shares of Dow Chemical stock.
In some instances diversification may result in the tying of one
commodity to another. The conditions for such tying are first, that
the seller is not "rounding out his line" in a bona fide manner; sec-
ondly, that the diversified product is sold in the same market; third,
that there is no genuine need for a complementary article; and last,
137. United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913).
138. International Harvester I: Supremacy, Fortune, Aug. 1933, p. 22. Query
whether there is a relationship between tying clauses and the stabilization of industry.
The theory, embodied in § 3 of the Clayton Act, that tying is monopolistic in
nature, has often been disputed. According to one school of thought, buyers retain
complete freedom of choice; they can either take the combination of principal and
ancillary (tied) goods or leave them. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co.,
247 U.S. 32, 66 (1918); Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454, 461
(8th Cir. 1903) ; Federal Trade Commission v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57
F.2d 152, 156 (2nd Cir. 1932); United Shoe Machinery Company v. Brunet [1909]
A.C. 330, 343. Cf. STEVENS, UNFAIR COmPETITION 75 (1917); Hale, Trust Dissolu-
tion, 40 COL. L. REV. 615, 625 (1940). Another argument, chiefly applicable to
patents, is comparable to the freedom of choice theory. It may be called the "un-
limited condition" theory. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519 (1917); Kales, Contracts to Keep
Up the Price on Resale and to Buy or Use Other Articles in Connection with Those
Sold, 3 CORNELL L.Q. 89, 97 (1918). Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp.,
26 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ind. 1939), aff'd, 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 618 (1941) plaintiff's supplemental brief in District Court at 19. Such
arguments imply the absence of monopoly in the principal product. Federal Trade
Commission v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 428 (1920); Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco
Co., 125 Fed. 454, 460 (8th Cir. 1903); Federal Trade Commission v. Paramount
Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1932). And vice versa: United
States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 400 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 618 (1941).
139. MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION 194, 199 (1941); see Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949).
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that the seller has some monopoly power. In the light of the foregoing
limitations, it would seem difficult to prove that diversification inevi-
tably resulted in tying.
Tying clauses otherwise objectionable may be justified when
they are merely designed to protect the goodwill of the seller. Another
decision 140 involving the General Motors Corporation held that that
concern could require its dealers not to use rival replacement parts in
repairing its automobiles. In the opinion of the court the restriction,
was justified by General Motors' legitimate desire to maintain good
will in its vehicles. It is nevertheless plain that protection of good will
does not justify the use of tying clauses when other lawful means would
accomplish the same purpose.' 41 Accordingly, in the General Motors
case involving the tying of the automobiles to GMAC financing, the
court found that other methods would have protected the defendant's
good will. In the opinion it was said:
The appellants justify their coercive course of business on the
ground that the GMAC service is superior to that of its com-
petitors, and because they fear that unregulated dealers' financing
would promote such evils as packing, excessive repossessions and
cut-throat methods of competition..
The evidence shows that the coercive conduct in question was
not intended to discriminate against an inferior or unreliable
finance service. Rather its entire force and effect was directed
against any use of any independent finance service.
No doubt it is proper for GMC and GMSC to promote manu-
facturer's goodwill and to protect the manufacturer against ineffi-
cient and unscrupulous dealers. . . . But there is a limit in law
to which a manufacturer may go to control the whole process of
distribution. The jury found that the appellants had gone too
far with their control plans, and we are inclined to approve and
to indorse the jury finding.142
140. Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd
per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936).
141. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 138
et seq. (1936).
142. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 400 (7th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). The court continued: ". . . we should think that
the appellants would have been able to fiuid a way to punish unscrupulous dealers
without penalizing the others at the same time. If in fact unregulated dealers'
financing leads to widespread abuses in the retail sale of automobiles, a need indeed
would arise for regulation and control in order to protect the public interest. It is
doubtful whether regulation in this respect should be entrusted to the dominant manu-
facturers . . . If in truth some outside control of dealers' financing is necessary, it
should originate with the legislators . . ." Ibid. Even the Attorney General ad-
mitted that the maintenance of good will justified some control over the finance com-
panies. That admission took the form of an attempt to create a regulatory code for
the independent financiers. Birnbaum, The Auto-Finance Conent Decree, 24 WASH.
U.L.Q. 525, 547 et seq. (1939).
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Even in those instances in which diversification does result in
tying, therefore, the result is not necessarily objectionable. The boza
fide protection of good will is an approved justification for tying clauses.
Price cutting. A second complaint against diversification is that
it leads to selected price cutting. The seller of more than one product
may take a loss upon a single item and continue a profitable business
by maintaining high prices on his other products. In trade parlance,
this is the familiar "loss leader" practice.'43 In the older anti-trust cases
a similar practice was characterized as the use of "fighting brands."
In those days a manufacturer, attempting to ruin his competitor, would
package his goods in a container similar to those of the rival and sell
the "fighting brand" far below cost.'
Upon several occasions it has been argued that diversification leads
to ruinous price cutting. Mr. Justice Cardozo's reluctance to permit
the large meat packers to enter the grocery business was based upon
such fears. He laid stress upon the immense size of the packers, saying
that the consent decree imposed upon them had been designed to pre-
vent the use of that size to "drive their rivals to the wall." 145 Pro-
fessor Burns demonstrated that profits from one branch of a busi-
ness could be used to attempt monopoly in another.'46 Similar fears
of diversification were voiced by Professor Edwards:
. an enterprise that sells a wide variety of commodities
may select as its victim a concern that specializes in the sale of one
or a few of these commodities, and may with impunity undertake
a similar program of price cutting limited to the items sold by the
specialized concern. In its crudest form such an attack may be
pushed so far as to destroy one concern after another and thus to
enlarge the attacking enterprise. Less crudely, however, the power
to make such localized attacks may be used as a disciplinary de-
vice to induce the small concerns to adopt policies that the larger
and more diversified enterprise regards as satisfactory. In this
form the program is unlikely to require many instances of localized
price cutting or to require that these cuts be very deep or very
long sustained. The mere power to undertake such a program
143. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION: REQUISITES OF A GOVERNMENTAL
POLICY 20, 101 (1949).
144. DAVIES, TRUST LAWS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 313 (1915). The practice
of using "fighting brands" is only a result of diversification if each brand be con-
sidered a separate commodity. Otherwise it falls into the category of horizontal
integration.
145. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116, 117 (1932). Partly in
recognition of this point of view, the Congress enacted the "commodities clause" of
the Interstate Commerce Act, February 4, 1887, as amended June 29, 1906, 34 STAT.
585, 49 USCA § 1(8) (1946). Cf. 1 Sc HARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION 42 (1931). Similar legislation has been enacted in several states.
MARTIN, STATE ANTITRUST LAWS: LIII (W.P.A. 1940).
146. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 451 (1936).
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is sufficient to lend authority to the large enterprise and to per-
suade the small one that a conciliatory policy is wise.14
Analysis of price cutting. If the maker of two products cuts the
price of one of them below cost, using profits from the other to main-
tain his general position, he may be attempting to monopolize the first
product. His ability to do so depends upon several conditions. He
must have enough monopoly in the second product to earn high profits.
For without high profits he cannot subsidize his attempt to monopolize
the first commodity. In the second place, the seller must enjoy a rea-
sonable prospect of successfully monopolizing the first item. Unless he
has such a prospect of potential success, he will be making a poor in-
vestment. Again, the price-cutter must be prepared to fend off re-
taliatory action by competitors.148 And if the cut prices are subse-
quently raised in an effort to capitalize upon monopoly achieved, new
firms may be attracted into the industry.1
49
A would-be monopolist can finance his effort to control a market
from many sources. Subscribed capital may be used to keep an enter-
prise solvent during a price-cutting foray. Earnings may be hoarded
for such a purpose. A company with little working capital may be able
to raise cash by means of loans secured by mortgage. Or it may re-
sort to the recently popular practice of selling its plant and leasing it
back from the grantee.150 There are, in other words, many methods
by which funds can be obtained to support an attempt to monopolize.
Profits from diversified operations constitute but one means of accom-
plishing that result. Professor Edwards admitted as much.'' Unless,
therefore, we are prepared to block all other avenues of raising cash to
finance a price-cutting venture, it is doubtful whether diversification
should be condemned on that ground.
147. EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 143, at 159.
148. Id. at 20 et seq.
149. Burns, op. cit. supra note 146, at 452. Cf. EDWARDS, op. Cit. supra note 143,
at 95, where it is said: ". . . Alternatively the need for internal congruity in the
policies adopted for different products, channels of distribution, and classes of cus-
tomers may induce the monopoly to refrain from pressing its advantage in dealing
with buyers whose bargaining position is unusually weak; and differences in the
products, markets, and distributive channels of a few large enterprises may make
collusion relatively difficult. Thus the complex monopoly may be either harsher or
milder than the simple one."
150. Cary, Corporate Financing Through the Sale and Leaseback of Property, 62
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1948).
151. EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 143, at 169. Cf. STEvENs, UNFAIR ComPETITIon
43 et seq. (1917). Note that in the use of "fighting brands" as described by Stevens
a seller may be competing with himself as well as with his rivals. It should also be
observed that the fighting brands theory requires an acceptance of the doctrine that
each brand is a separate commodity before it affects diversification. Cf. also United
States v. Quaker Oats Company, 232 Fed. 499 (N.D. Ill. 1916).
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Possibly price cutting may constitute discrimination of a monopoly
type. 5  And diversification may furnish the foundation for such price
cutting. It certainly does not follow that diversification inevitably leads
to such conduct: there is nothing to indicate that price cutting neces-
sarily or even probably flows from the existence of diversification.
And one can scarcely argue that diversification causes both price cut-
ting and tied sales concurrently. For in a tied sale, the ancillary product
is sold at a price above free market levels, while price cutting implies
a sale below such figures. In other words, tied sales and price cutting
cannot exist together in the same circumstances: either the sale is tied
or the price is cut, but both practices cannot exist at once. Thus no
one may assert that diversification causes both price cutting and tying
unless he refers to different times or places.
Another consideration results from the fact that sales of com-
plementary goods may be made upon a tied basis without an attempt
to monopolize. 5 3 An aspect of this issue was raised in the well known
Gasoline Pump case."54 There leading oil companies leased pumps for
the dispensation of gasoline at nominal rentals to operators of filling
stations, the latter agreeing not to sell rival gasoline from the leased
pump. Since the agreement permitted the service station operator to
deal in rival gasoline from other pumps, the courts held that neither
violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act 155 nor of the Clayton
Act had been proven. The Trade Commission had urged an injury
both to other marketers of gasoline who were not in a position to supply
pumps at nominal rentals and to makers of the pumps who lost busi-
ness through the practice. But the courts dismissed those suggestions
in summary fashion. Possibly the case would not be followed today, but
to the extent that it was soundly decided, it is authority for the view
that diversification resulting in the provision of complementary goods
below cost is not necessarily the same thing as price cutting with an
intent to monopolize: the practice may constitute a mere convenience
to the consumer. In essence, it is only an extension of credit. And
every firm which extends credit is partly in the banking business '5
152. STEVENS, op. cit. supra note 151, at 51. Cf. RoBiNsoN, THE EcoNomics oF
IMPERFECT COMPETITION, C. 15 (1936).
153. THORP AND COWDER, op. cit. sapra note 49, at 667.
154. Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 476
(1923). There Mr. Justice McReynolds declared: "The suggestion that the assailed
practice is unfair because of its effect upon the sale of pumps by their makers is
sterile and requires no serious discussion." He also said (at 475) : "The powers of
the Commission are limited by the statutes. It has no general authority to compel
competitors to a common level, to interfere with ordinary business methods or to
prescribe arbitrary standards for those engaged in the conflict for advantage called
competition . . . it is essential that those who adventure their time, skill and capital
should have large freedom of action in the conduct of their own affairs."
155. Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §41 (1946).
156. Hautrey, Credit, 4 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 545, 548 (1931).
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and is thus cutting the price of credit below banker's rates. Theo-
retically we might prohibit the extension of credit by sellers of other
commodities. Concentration of all such transactions in commercial
banks might focus lending in a desirable manner.' 57 But the course of
trade for centuries indicates that the extension of credit by sellers is a
practical necessity. Indeed, there is support for the contention of Gen-
eral Motors 158 that its extension of credit through GMAC was neces-
sary to effect satisfactory sales. A prominent farm implement com-
pany has recently adopted a similar program. 59
To the extent that price cutting does constitute an attempt to
monopolize, it would seem desirable to deal with it under the specific
terms of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 60 Cutting the price of a par-
ticular product with intent to monopolize is surely comparable to the
old-fashioned local price cutting upon a geographical basis. Such a
territorial discrimination is clearly a violation of the Sherman Act; 161
Professor Levi has called it a typical "abuse" falling within the pro-
hibitions of that statute. 6 Neither reliance on other statutes 163 nor
general condemnation of diversification seems necessary.
Price cutting by public utilities. If a business is subject to the
fixing of its prices by public authority, diversification (and tying
clauses) may have a more serious effect. It is commonplace for fixed
price industries to indulge in outside activities. Many public utility
companies sell electric or gas appliances and at least one prominent
utility company has a large stake in the production of oil.16 4  If such a
business is regulated, diversification may become the basis for a scheme
to avoid the effect of government control. Vertical integration may
157. Under 62 STAT. 1291, c. 836, 12 U.S.C. § 248n, the Federal Reserve Board
was authorized to control consumer credit until June 30, 1949. § 1 of the Act refers
to Exec. Order No. 8843 (1941) which was the basis of the original regulation W.
As revised, regulation W, 12 Code Fed. Regs. § 222 (1948) regulated down pay-
ments and the interval of subsequent payments in time sales (§ 222.3). If all lending
transactions were concentrated in commercial banks, it would not be necessary to
adopt such elaborate controls over sellers generally. The complaint has been regis-
tered that General Motors' easy finance terms sell more automobiles than people
"ought" to buy. ARNOLD, THE BOTTLENECKS OF BusiNEss 24 (1940).
158. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 406 (7th Cir. 1941).
On the other hand, a control of credit may be accomplished better through regulations
of the type in question than through an attempt to press the antitrust laws into such
prohibitions.
159. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COmPANY, ANN. REP., 1948, at 6.
160. 28 STAT. 209 (1890); 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1946).
161. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
162. Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. OF CHI. L. Rav. 153, 158
(1947). But cf. Package Closure Corporation v. Sealright Co., Inc., 141 F.2d 972,
977 (2d Cir. 1944).
163. Cf. § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 703 (1914) ; 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946).
164. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, ANN. REP., 1948, at 6 (nearly
1/4th of net profit derived from oil production). Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Bald-
ridge v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 18 Pa. Corp. Rep. 243 (1929), aff'd, 300 Pa. 577,
151 Atl. 344 (1930) (corporation chartered to supply light, heat and power may
properly engage in sale of appliances).
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have a similar effect. Thus it has been charged that a prominent public
utility corporation has inflated its rate base by the purchase of sup-
plies and materials from a wholly-owned subsidiary at exorbitant
prices.'6 5 A good example of the use of diversification to avoid the
effect of government control is found in the liquor business under
OPA controls. By government action, the price of whiskey was
fixed at a low figure in relation to market values. Accordingly, dis-
tributors refused to sell whiskey unless rum, gin and other products
less in demand were also purchased. The effect of such tying arrange-
ments was to move a considerable quantity of the less desired products
at prices above the market with accompanying profit to the dealers,
thus enabling them partially to avoid the price control.166
More frequently fixed-price businesses are accused of price cut-
ting in the sale of ancillary products. Putting the matter another
way, diversification may permit a public utility to juggle its cost fig-
ures. Since a utility is guaranteed a limited return upon its public
utility business, it may try to allocate the cost of diversified operations
to the controlled enterprise and thereby justify rate increases.'
6 7 It will
be noted that the foregoing practice is substantially the reverse of that
usually found in the diversification-tying clause situations. There the
tied commodity is sold above market price; but erroneous cost account-
ing will result in the sale of the by-products of the utility below market
price. This fact is the source of much complaint from independent
dealers who compete with the public utility companies in the sale of
electric and gas appliances. They assert that losses incurred in the
sale of refrigerators, stoves and the like are recouped by higher rates
for utility service. 8'
That the sales of appliances may actually be made below cost
is evident from the following statement:
The crux of the matter is whether not a utility shall be privi-
ledged to sell appliances below cost and recoup losses by capitaliz-
ing them or by changing them to operating expenses. The public
utilities emphasize the promotional aspect, namely, that appliances
and service are complementary goods, and that from the stand-
point of the consumer, the demand is a joint one. . . . The utili-
ties have urged that the merchandising department is properly a
165. Complaint in United States v. Western Electric Company, #17-49 (D.N.J.
1949).
166. Coffin-Redington Co. v. Porter, 156 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1946); N.Y. Times,
January 30, 1945, p. 13, col. 6. Cf. Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 Fed.
737 (8th Cir. 1909).
167. BARNES, THE ECONOmICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 627 (1942).
168. Behling, Competition and Monopoly in Public Utility Industries, 23 ILLINOIS
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 50 (1938).
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promotional department, and as such should not be required to be
self-supporting. The argument that appliance losses are recovered
through rates for service is answered by pointing to the decreased
costs and lower rates which result from the expansion of busi-
ness made possible by cheap appliances. . 169
Pressure from independent merchants has resulted in statutes in some
states prohibiting the sale of appliances by public utilities.' 70
Considerations of the foregoing character have suggested that pub-
lic utility companies should be forbidden to diversify. Professor Barnes
urged that the utility should be under a heavy burden of proof to jus-
tify entry into businesses other than its principal public service. 7 '
And Professor Edwards was even more insistent upon a separation of
controlled from uncontrolled business.' 72 Perhaps there is no satisfac-
tory basis upon which to fix the prices of public utility concerns. But if
regulation is to be attempted it may be necessary to prevent diversifica-
tion into free markets.
Exclusion from markets. In the pending duPont case 173 a prin-
cipal allegation of the complaint is that suppliers are excluded from
markets. According to the Attorney General, the duPont Company,
General Motors Corporation and the United States Rubber Company
enjoy common control by members of the duPont family. That con-
trol is so exercised-or a conspiracy among the three corporations has
similarly arranged-that the firms trade among themselves whenever
possible. General Motors, for example, buys its tires from U. S. Rub-
ber and its paint from duPont. Thus independent tire makers and
paint manufacturers are excluded from the General Motors market .
4
In large measure the question is one of vertical integration. As-
suming thiat the three corporations are under the alleged common con-
169. Id. at 51.
170. Id. at 50. Expenditures incurred in such sidelines may be disregarded in
fixing rates. People's Gas Co. v. Slattery, 373 Ill. 31, 65, 25 N.E.2d 482, 499 (1940).
171. Note 167 supra, at 277 et seq.
172. Edwards, An Appraisal of the Antitrust Laws, 36 PRoc. Am. ECON. AssN.
172, 262 (1946). In BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY 199 (1932)
the authors declared: "Whether or not this [Cities Service Company type] inter-
relation between utility companies and unregulated business companies is desirable
from a public point of view is more than doubtful. The greatest danger lies in the
menace to the credit of the public utilities when these essential and non-competitive
enterprises are financially affiliated with highly speculative businesses like oil pro-
duction."
Several statutes attempt to reach such problems; e.g., Illinois Public Utility Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 111 2/3, §§ 1 et seq., 12, 27(g) (1947); Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, 52 STAT. 973 (1938) ; 49 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1946). § 408 appears to prohibit
both control of an air carrier by another type of common carrier and control of an
aircraft manufacturer by an air carrier (subject to approval of the CAB).
173. Complaint in United States v. E. I. DuPont deNemours and Co., #49 C
1071 (1949).
174. Id. complaint 120, 21, 22, 24, 30(b) (1), 30(b) (2).
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trol, they may be regarded as a single, highly diversified firm: there
is actually but one enterprise, engaged in many different businesses.
To the extent that the different departments of the one concern have
occasion to buy supplies from each other, diversification will give rise
to the alleged vices of vertical integration. 5 Thus, it is said, markets
may be foreclosed and competition reduced.
In the long run, the alleged exclusion of tire makers other than
U. S. Rubber from the General Motors market suggests that General
Motors is paying more for its casings than independent suppliers ask.
For if the rival rubber firms do not meet U. S. Rubber's price, it is
difficult to understand upon what ground it is thought that they should
obtain General Motors' business.
But what motive have the duPonts in causing General Motors
to pay more than market prices for tires? Can they grow rich by
selling to themselves at fancy figures? And if General Motors actually
did pay more than market prices for tires, paint and a host of other
products, it is difficult to understand how it could compete successfully
with rival automobile manufacturers.
In the complaint against the duPonts it is alleged both that U. S.
Rubber made unwarranted profits out of its sales to General Motors
and that the latter obtained its tires at lower cost than its competitors,
thus enhancing its size and power.' 7 1 It would seem to follow that
U. S. Rubber produced tires at lower cost than its competitors. Other-
wise the statement would contradict itself. And if U. S. Rubber pro-
duced more efficiently, its rivals would stand in a poor position to
complain of its success.
Perhaps the foregoing analysis rests upon assumptions of pure
and perfect competition. Under conditions of pure competition, "sell-
ing costs," which exist in markets characterized by a degree of im-
perfect competition, would disappear. 7 7  The complaint against the
duPonts states that General Motors was "giving," and had "arbitrarily
granted," a substantial percentage of its business to U. S. Rubber .
78
Such language implies a market of rigid or sticky prices, possibly made
175. Hale, Vertical Integration, 49 COL. L. REv. 921 (1949).
176. Note 173 supra, at 1111 32, 133. It is alleged in the complaint (1[30(c))
that the defendants conspired to prevent diversification by General Motors into the
chemical industry. At the same time it is alleged that the defendants agreed to divide
the fields of activity among the three corporations (1[ 65). It is difficult to understand
how the defendants can be both sued as a combination and also charged with division
of territory. If a defendant constituted a single unit in violation of § 2 of the Sherman
Act, he could hardly conspire with himself in violation of § 1. Cf. The Sherman Act
and the Enforcement of Competition, Discussion, 38 Am. ECON. REV. 204, 206 (1948)
(remarks by Mr. Watkins).
177. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 126 (1938).
178. Note 173 supra, at 1f 123.
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so by reason of the effects of section 2 of the Clayton Act. 7 ' Apart
from the alleged combination, it suggests the absence of pure com-
petition.
Sales among three companies under common control would reduce
selling costs, thus enabling each concern to secure an advantage over
its competitors. That advantage would be derived from the elimina-
tion of an element of monopoly-conditions of imperfect competition.
It is doubtful whether public policy should favor the dissolution of the
combination: an attack upon the monopolistic elements in the markets
which made the combination profitable might achieve the same imme-
diate results, if any, and also farther reaching benefits.
Control of substitutes. Another complaint against diversification
is that it leads to the control of substitutes and hence to monopoly.
Since diversification is required to carry a firm into the sale of sub-
stitute products, any argument against the control of substitutes may
be considered an argument against a form of diversification. Thus it
has been said:
A business unit which enters upon the production of a substi-
tute for its original product frequently does so to protect its in-
vestment in plant and good will. There is little inducement to such
a concern to compete vigorously with itself.1
80
Particular attention has been paid to the entry of newspaper pub-
lishers into the field of radio broadcasting. In 1941 the Federal Com-
munications Commission issued an order directing an investigation
into applications for broadcasting licenses by persons publishing news-
papers.' 8 ' After much opposition had developed, the Commission finally
dismissed the investigation and refused to adopt a general rule on the
subject. In doing so, however, it voiced serious doubts as to the de-
sirability of permitting newspaper publishers to operate radio broad-
casting stations :
the Commission recognizes the serious problem in-
volved in the broader field of the control of the media of mass
communications and the importance of avoiding monopoly of the
avenues of communicating fact and opinion to the public. All the
Commissioners agree to the general principle that diversification
of control of such media is desirable. . . The Commission does
179. Burling and Sheldon, Price Competttion as Affected by ttw Robinson-
Patitn Act, 1 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 31, 34 (1939); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 92 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1937).
180. Hale, Trwrt Dissolution, 40 CoL. L. REv. 615, 626 (1940). In that connec-
tion it has also been said (supra note 143, at 266) :"The protection afforded by com-
petition does not consist merely in the ability to play one trader off against another
within a single market. It consists also in the ability to turn to substitute goods and
to satisfy one's needs from the products of different industries."
181. 8 F.C.C. REP. 589 (1941).
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not feel that it should deny a license merely because the applicant
is engaged or interested in a particular type of business. How-
ever, it does not intend in granting licenses in the public interest to
permit concentration of control in the hands of the few to the ex-
clusion of the many. *82
Similar views have been expressed by individual commissioners in
cases involving specific applications. Thus Commissioner Fly said that
a broadcast license should not be granted when the applicant controlled
the only newspaper in the area.1
83
In the realm of public utilities, statutes have specifically prohibited
certain types of diversification. Thus the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act of 1935 provides that no holding company is to acquire
the stock of both electric and gas utilities in the same area when state
law prohibitis such action.'8 4  A comparable limitation is found in
the Communications Act of 1934.'8'
Control of substitutes, except for that achieved by patent control,
can result only from diversification. Without the adding of additional
commodities to the seller's "line," he can scarcely be said to control sub-
stitutes for his basic commodity. On the other hand, it has never been
contended that diversification necessarily leads to the control of sub-
stitutes. Indeed, the control of substitutes can only occur when diver-
sification is narrowly limited. If diversification extends beyond one
"industry," it is unlikely that it will include a "substitute" product.
Professor Burns declared that it was difficult to find actual examples
of diversification motivated by a desire to control substitutes.'8 6
As in the case of tying clauses, control of substitutes depends upon
an element of monopoly in the sale of the original product. If a seller
of butter enters the oleomargarine business, then, in order to create a
wasteful effect, he must either monopolize the butter market or monopo-
lize the oleomargine market. Unless he accomplishes one of the two
foregoing results, he will not have caused harm.8 7 Such considera-
tions lead to the conclusion that the mere fact of diversification into the
field of substitute products is not a cause of monopoly conditions. Thus
Professor Burns said:
182. 9 FED. REG. 702 (1944) ; Conrad, Economic Aspects of Radio Regulation, 34
VA. L. REv. 283, 291 (1948).
183. Barnes & Weiland, 8 F.C.C. REP. 46, 54 (1940). Query whether a distinc-
tion should be drawn between the problem of substitute control in the field of radio
broadcasting and elsewhere in that radio stations broadcast news. (Is monopoly of
the dissemination of news worse than other alleged monopolies?)
184. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 817 (1935), 15
U.S.C. §79i (1946).
185. Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1087 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 314 (Supp.
1948).
186. Note 146 srupra, at 454. Professor Burns also declared that substitute
integration is not always easy to identify. Id. at 453.
187. Id. at 455.
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The opportunity for postponing the introduction of new prod-
ucts or the utilization of new methods depends upon the degree of
imperfection of the market. If new substitute products are made
but sold at a high price with the object of maintaining the sales
of older types, new non-integrated firms with no losses arising
from obsolescence may enter the market. Moreover, if the new
product is introduced by non-integrated firms, integrated firms
whose sales are likely to be reduced may . . . fight for survival
by entering the new field of production and may even hasten the
decline of prices there.'
There are several statutory prohibitions against diversification into
substitutes, but these relate chiefly to public utility companies.' 8 9 Since
almost every public utility company enjoys some degree of horizontal
monopoly, the statutes may be justified, but any such prohibition upon
trade in general might have unfortunate effects. In these times of a
rapidly changing economy business may have to run fast in order to
stand still.' In other words, it may not be a question of diversifica-
tion, but of the production of new products to take the place of old
ones. Finally, an attempt to prevent diversification into substitute
goods would involve serious administrative difficulties. In the last
analysis, substitution is a question of degree since almost every service
or product competes against every other. It has often been remarked,
for example, that consumers have preferred to buy new automobiles
rather than to improve their housing conditions. To prevent diversifi-
cation into substitutes, therefore, might well mean the prevention of
diversification altogether.
Continuity of corporate existence. An important effect of diversifi-
cation is that it permits continuity of corporate existence. Even though
the product originally made has become obsolete and unsalable, the
company may continue as prosperous as before. An interesting exam-
ple is found in a recent annual report:
188. Id. at 456.
189. Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5
(1946) ; New York Public Service Law § 70. But cf. Stahlman v. Federal Communi-
cations Commission, 126 F.2d 124, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1942) wherein it was said: "If in
this case it had been made to appear, as counsel for appellant insist, that the Com-
mission's investigation [pursuant to order #79 of 20 March 1941] was solely for the
purpose of the consideration or adoption of a hard and fast rule of policy, as the
result of which newspaper owners may be placed in a proscribed class and thus made
ineligible to apply for or receive broadcast licenses, we should be obliged to declare
that such an investigation would be wholly outside of and beyond any of the powers
with which Congress has clothed the Commission. For we have previously held that
there is nothing in the Act which either prevents or prejudices the right of a news-
paper, as such, to apply for and receive a license to operate a radio broadcast station."
190. Devlin, Making Diversification Pay, Magazine of Wall Street, Nov. 5, 1938,
p. 88, where it is said: "The ability of a company successfully to develop new products
and create new markets is the hallmark of corporate vitality and industrial leader-
ship . . ."
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Your company was originally started to manufacture husk-
ing pins and other hand husking equipment. As time went on
the glove and mitten line was added and far outgrew the original
products in volume of business. With the improvement of corn
husking machines, demand for hand corn huskers dwindled to
such small proportions that it was deemed advisable to dispose of
this part of our business.' 9'
Those who believe in the importance of new firms as promoters of com-
petition ' will, of course, find in diversification a cause of monopolistic
conditions. They have seen many new fields of industry pre-empted
by existing firms. 9' In other words, diversification prevents a cor-
poration from declining or dying with its product. It perpetuates in-
vestments and management powers.
Mere perpetuation of corporate existence does not seem objection-
able. While diversification may reduce the number of wholly new firms,
the important question is whether that effect is undesirable. A going
concern may be in a position to compete more avidly than a newcomer.
Certainly the complaint that diversification leads to price cutting sug-
gests such a result. From the standpoint of costs, as suggested above,
there may be considerable savings in the diversified, as opposed to the
wholly new, enterprise. There is some efficiency in avoiding the clos-
ing up and reopening of a business venture. In other words, con-
tinuity of operation, however diversified, may in itself result in the
saving of costs. But more important, an existing concern has facilities
in the nature of purchasing agents, employment officers, accountants
and the like, all of whom would have to be recruited anew for a sepa-
rate venture. Although the new activity undoubtedly increases the
costs of maintaining such services, it probably does so at a less than
proportional rate.
Avoidance of market appraisal of new ventures. It may be urged
that diversification avoids the test of the market place. Funds obtained
from corporate earnings and applied to new ventures by-pass the rigor-
ous tests applied by investment bankers to wholly new ventures. If a
single man dominates a corporation, his judgment alone may be re-
sponsible for entry into a new line of business. No concurrence from
the investing public is necessary.
191. THE Boss MANUFACTURING COMPANY, ANN. REP., 1948, at 2. Another
firm said: ". . . new products . . . give promise of helping balance the scale for
products which have felt the effect of retarded demand." Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
52ND ANN. REP. at 1 (1949).
192. OXENFELDT, NEW FIRMS AND FREE ENTERPRISE 17 et seq. (1943).
193. Id. at 45.
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It is true that diversification into new lines may be accomplished
without the floating of securities in the investment market. Of course,
the question relates as much to horizontal or vertical integration as it
does to diversification. And it must be noted that the complaint can-
not be made as to capital raised from normal investment sources: at
most, the argument relates to the reinvestment of earnings. A clever
observer has noted that a company which is in a position to direct its
earnings into new facilities would also be favorably situated to attract
new capital from investors.194 In other words, private investment of
earnings in diversified lines is not objectionable because the same re-
sult could be reached through the flotation of additional securities.
Retention and reinvestment of earnings does tend to increase total
investment. If earnings were all distributed to stockholders in the
form of dividends, they would, as indicated above, be heavily penalized
by taxation. Again, at least some of the shareholders would use those
earnings for current consumption rather than save them for capital
purposes.195 Thus the whole practice of reinvesting earnings runs into
the familiar controversy in regard to "over-saving" and "underinvest-
ment." Although the over-saving theory was once popular,196 it is
difficult to understand how general standards of living can be raised
without additional investment of capital.
Subsidies to ancillary products. A similar argument is that in-
efficiently made products are subsidized through diversification. A
firm may remain profitable despite the fact that one of its products
is produced in a wasteful manner.Y9 7  If that is so, it violates one of
the canons of competition laid down by Professor Edwards:
Traders must be responsive to incentives of profit and loss;
that is, they must not be so large, so diversified, so devoted to po-
litical rather than commercial purposes, so subsidized, or otherwise
so unconcerned with results in a particular market that their poli-
cies are not affected by ordinary commercial incentives arising out
of that market."9 "
It will be noted that the complaint just mentioned is not wholly dif-
ferent from that of price cutting. In both instances the product is
sold below its true cost. In price cutting, however, there is a deliberate
effort to injure a competitor.
194. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 256 (1940). Cf.
SWEEZy, SoclALISm 221 et seq. (1949) (attempt to prove that socialist economy will
not necessarily result in faulty allocation of resources).
195. BUCHANAN, op. cit. supra note 194, at 257.
196. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SocIETY 185 (1948).
197. THORP AND CROWDER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 666. Cf. note 173 supra, at
11130(b) (4), 30(b) (5), 30(b) (6).
198. Note 143 supra, at 9.
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Diversification does of course raise problems of cost accounting.
When diversification is of the divergent type, it will almost certainly
give rise to joint costs. Convergent diversification may also give rise
to joint costs and even if the products are wholly unrelated, it will
still be necessary to allocate certain overhead costs, such as executives'
salaries and specialized services, among the several products.
Many methods are used to allocate joint costs. Sometimes the
two products are made to bear costs of production in proportion to
their weight or bulk.199 Upon other occasions, market values of the
various commodities are used to allocate joint costs.2" It is easy
to demonstrate that such methods are arbitrary and can result in fan-
tastic computations.2 ' Professor Viner commonly used an illustration
in which a gram of radium was extracted from twenty tons of ore.
The radium, of course, was of great value but the slag (by-product)
was sold for a pittance. If, however, the allocation of costs were made
upon the basis of weight, the result would be the production of radium
for almost nothing.
From a theoretical point of view, it is possible to allocate joint
costs properly if the entrepreneur is able to vary the output of the sev-
eral products.202 A dispute continues among economists as to whether
it is always possible to vary the proportion of the various products pro-
duced by joint methods. 203 Granting that such variation is possible,
then familiar marginal principles permit a theoretical allocation of
costs. 20 4 On the other hand, there is little to indicate that such a com-
putation is practical in an actual business situation.0 5
Similar considerations affect the allocation of overhead costs.
Again, several methods of effecting such allocation are used by cost
accountants. Only upon marginal principles, however, would it be
possible to effect an accurate computation.20 ' And the difficulties in-
volved in any such attempt have led a number of economists to the
conclusion that overhead costs cannot be apportioned properly.
207
199. T.N.E.C. Hearings, Part 17-A, 76th Cong. 2d Sess. 10,092 (1940).
200. T.N.E.C. Hearings, Part 17-A, 76th Cong. 2d Sess. 10,056 (1940). This
method also is faulty. Kreps, Joint Costs in the Chemical Industry, 44 QuARTERLy
JbunNAL EcoN. 416, 420 et seq. (1930).
201. Canning, Cost Accounting, 4 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 477 (1931).
202. CONFERENCE ON PRICE RESEARCH, CommITTEE ON PRICE DETERmINATION,
COST BEHAVIOR AND PRICE POLICY 179 (1943). In Kreps, Joint Costs in the Chemical
Industry, 44 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 416, 427 (1930) it is said: "Neither accountants
nor economists have been able to devise a method which will yield [joint] cost figures
that do not contain a large element of arbitrariness."
203. CONFERENCE ON PRICE RESEARCH, supra note 202, at 176. Kreps, supra note
202, at 452.
204. Viner, Cost, 4 ENcYc. Soc. SC. 466, 473 (1931).
205. CONFERENE ON PRICE RESEARCH, supra note 202, at 177 et seq.
206. Id. at 183, 181.
207. GARVER & HANSEN, PRINCILES OF ECONOmiCS 114 (3d ed. 1947).
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It is thus apparent that diversification may so cloud a concern's
cost structure as to result in the shelter of inefficiently made products;
a given commodity may be subsidized without the knowledge of its
producer. Admitting that such sheltering can occur, it must be noted
that the only means of avoiding the cost allocation problems outlined
above would be to prohibit all variations in manufacture and distribu-
tion. In other words, a manufacturer would be permitted to make
only one model, size or style of a commodity. A distributor could
vend but a single item. Only then would all common costs be elim-
inated. While it might not be impossible so to confine manufacturers,
it would obviously be inefficient to compel distributors thus to narrow
the goods they sell. Such a program would close every department
store.
Price rigidity. Diversification is also said to permit the main-
tenance of prices. Even though demand for a single item is slack and
output must be restricted, a diversified producer need not reduce the
price of that particular goods. When firms are producing more than
one product, the profits from one part of their output may be used to
compensate for the losses arising from restriction of other parts of
the output. That is, a firm may want to maintain prices for fear of
"spoiling" the future market by price reductions. The judgment of
the managers might be that, viewed over a long period, the loss should
be incurred in the expectation that the situation would be temporary
and that future profits would be greater by virtue of their not having
"spoiled" the market by price reductions. The restriction may be
financed in many ways. Profits fiom other parts of the output is one
possibility.
208
Price rigidity differs from the sheltering of an inefficiently made
product in that it suggests that the commodity is priced too high rather
than too low. But it does involve the problems of common costs out-
lined above. In addition, if a firm diversifies so as to avoid seasonal
or cyclical trends, it may thus be enabled to support its price structures.
A maker of Christmas tree ornaments who diversifies into the knitting
of bathing suits may regularize his receipts in such a manner as to
avoid the necessity of reducing the price of his primary product in
periods of low seasonal demand.2 9 This is obviously a contradiction of
the argument, previously discussed, that diversification leads to price
208. THORP AND CROWVDER, op. cit mtpra note 11, at 668.
209. Time is an important factor. A merchant does not cut the price of a com-
modity because a single day's sales are poor. He lets his other goods "carry" the
commodity for some period of time.
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cutting. Prices cannot be both too rigid and too fluid at the same time
and place. Thus to some degree the argument that diversification leads
to price rigidity is balanced by the allegation that it leads to sales
below cost. And there is little in available literature to indicate that
diversification is an important cause of price rigidity.
Excessive selling costs; increased capital requirements. Again,
it is urged that diversification compels competitors likewise to diversify.
When one producer starts selling a "full line," all others must do like-
wise in order to remain in the market.21 The effect then may be to
increase the amount of capital required to enter the industry. A new
enterpriser may find that he is unable to get dealers to handle his
new and better product unless he can introduce a complete line and
the advertising services to go with it. This increase in capital require-
ments automatically reduces the number of persons who are able to
start new enterprises."' 1 And it is urged that such a raising of capital
requirements is inherently wasteful. 2
The complaint that diversification leads to excessive selling costs
is related to the argument against the spreading of trade marks. For
the value of a trade mark results from advertising, and vigorous attacks
are constantly leveled at merchandising expenditures.213 In modem
economic thinking sales expenses are suspect. 214  As to divergent di-
versification, however, no such argument can be made because the prod-
ucts are not sold together. We may therefore test the thesis that
divergent diversification is efficient whereas convergent diversification is
wasteful.215 The argument would run that the latter type of diversifi-
cation related only to sales and that selling expenses are uneconomic.
On the other hand, it has been said that divergent diversification is not
210. THORP AND CROWDER, op. dt. szupra note 11, at 652.
211. RAYMOND, THE LIITIST 36 (1947).
212. CHA .BERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLIsTIc COMPETITION 123 (3d ed.
1938).
213. SIMONS, op. cit. supra note 196, at 71. Cf. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFm-
EN cE BOA"D, MERGERS AND THE LAW 88 (1929) where it was said: ". . . most manu-
facturers are constrained to build up their own sales forces and to maintain their own
advertising campaigns. This practice has resulted in excessive duplication of selling
effort and an enormous waste in advertising outlays. Not infrequently a whole line
of similar products may be advertised just as effectively, and with no greater cost,
than a single product in the line. The same situation applies to the maintenance of
selling agencies, distributing warehouses and like facilities."
214. CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra note 212, at 120 et seq. Professor Chamberlin
said (at 123) : "Cost of production includes all expenses which must be met in order
to provide the commodity or service, transport it to the buyer, and put it into his
hands ready to satisfy his wants. Cost of selling includes all outlays made in order
to secure a demand, or a market, for the product. The former costs create utilities
in order that demands may be satisfied; the latter create and shift the demands
themselves."
215. Cf. People ex rel. Tiffany & Co. v. Campbell, 144 N.Y. 166, 38 N.E. 990
(1894) ; Richmond Guano Co. v. Farmer's Ginnery Co., 126 Fed. 712 (4th Cir.
1903); Burk v. Mead, 159 Ind. 252, 64 N.E. 880 (1902) (doctrine of ultra vires
applied to convergent diversification).
DIVERSIFICATION: IMPACT OF MONOPOLY POLICY
necessarily efficient. It may cause plant expansion beyond the optimum
scale.216 Again, convergent diversification may contain elements of
efficiency. As we have seen, the practice of "rounding out the line"
is indulged in for the benefit of the distributor. Thus a manufacturer
practicing convergent diversification may partially replace a whole-
saler.21 7  To the extent that he does so, he may be able to function at
a reduced cost and thus to increase efficiency. Professor Burns sug-
gested that integration of this type may secure technical economies of
production.1
In these circumstances it is difficult to arrive at any conclusion
regarding the alleged inefficiency of convergent diversification. Per-
haps market forces can be counted upon to effect satisfactory adjust-
ments.21 9
CONCLUSIONS
In the larger sense, most of the alleged vices of diversification
should be blamed upon the lack of pure 220 and perfect competition.
Diversification is only the surface cause of many economic faults whose
roots lie in a degree of horizontal monopoly. Competitive imperfec-
tions account for much of the remainder: lack of organized markets,22'
buyers' inadequate knowledge, absence of standardized commodities
and, above all, the factor of time, prevent goods from moving as rapidly
and prices as freely as required for maximum utilization of resources.222
Coupled with a degree of "horizontal" monopoly, diversification
may serve as a basis for undesirable conduct. It may, for instance,
upply reserve funds for a price cutting foray. Or it may permit an
attempt to monopolize a substitute product, thus adding additional force
216. THORP AND CROWDER, op. cit. suPra note 11, at 664.
217. Id. at 670.
218. Note 146 spra, at 446. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENcE BOARD, sup-a
note 213, at 89.
219. One of the outstanding examples of convergent diversification was Standard
Brands, Inc. Its delivery service for Fleischmann's Yeast was used as the nucleus of a
system of distributing all types of groceries. Recently, however, the company has
abandoned the use of its own delivery system. STANDARD BRANDS, INC., ANN. REP.,
1948, at 4. Apparently an oil company has similarly abandoned the sale of sporting
goods through filling stations. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM Co., ANN. REP., 1948, at 18.
When a trade mark is applied to a new commodity, the question whether its
alleged monopoly effect is thereby increased is a difficult one. Professor Burns said
in THE DECLINE OF COMPFETITION (1936), at 447 et seq.: ". . . emphasis upon brand
names being an inevitable accompaniment of advertising, attempts to increase the
return per unit of advertising expenditure sometimes lead to the use of a brand name
for a variety of products. The advertising of each product tends, not only to promote
the sales of that product, but also to make the brand name under which it is sold
more familiar, and to promote the sales of other products of the same name."
220. Note 212 supra, at 6.
221. Cf. Hale, Agreentents Among Competitors, 33 MINN. L. REv. 331, 356
(1949).
222. In United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 398 (7th Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941), the court declared that a dealer would
suffer a loss if his "franchise" were cancelled. No doubt market imperfections account
for such truth as may be contained in that statement.
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to a "horizontal" monopoly power. But this study suggests that di-
versification is not monopolistic per se.228 The mere fact that a firm
produces or distributes more than one commodity should not consti-
tute an infringement of the anti-trust laws. Professor Edwards can
almost be taken to have admitted as much." 4 And even if diversifica-
tion contained a considerable element of monopoly, its efficiency and
stabilizing effect might compel us to accept it in considerable degree.
In addition, the administrative difficulties in its prevention might well
prove insuperable.2 5
Horizontal integration is the heart of the monopoly problem:
the Sherman Act is the charter of commercial freedom. Efforts to
cope with monopoly by attacking "abuses" and "practices" lead to all
the contradictions and waste motion of the Clayton Act. They entwine
business in a tangle of regulation which can never be fully effective
because it does not achieve the reduction of monopoly itself.2 26 If we
223. It is interesting to note that the DuPont Company, officially charged with
violation of the Sherman Act, seems to have been less prosperous than two of its less
diversified competitors. According to FITca INDMDUAL STocK BULLETINS, DuPont
profits in 1939 were $7.66 per share. In that year Dow Chemical Company earned
$.94 a share and Monsanto Chemical Company $1.34 a share. DuPont's 1948 report
shows profits of $13.12 a share; FITCH shows Dow's 1948 profit at $3.72 a share and
Monsanto's 1948 report shows its profit for that year $3.95 a share. In other words,
DuPont's profits rose 71'A% while Dow increased its profits 296% and Monsanto
195%.
224. Note 143 supra, at 130. Cf. id. at 100.
225. In the General Motors case the company could, so far as extension of credit
to dealers alone was concerned, have merely permitted delayed payment on its own
books. Certainly there is little authority to suggest that such a practice is unlawful.
Again, the question of where protection of good will is justified raises difficult prob-
lems. But see United States v. General Motors Corporation, 121 F.2d 376, 407 (7th
Cir. 1941) wherein the court says that motive is immaterial.
226. Holmes, J., dissenting in Motion Picture Patent Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519 (1917). Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherma Act: Power or
Purpose? 43 IL. L. REv. 745, 772 (1949). But cf. Standard Oil Co. of California v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 311 (1949). In the Senate Report on the Clayton Act,
it was said: "Broadly stated, the bill . . . seeks to prohibit . . . certain trad& prac-
tices which, as a rule, singly and in themselves, are not covered by the Act of July 2,
1890 . . . and thus, by making these practices illegal, to arrest the creation of trusts,
conspiracies and monopolies in their incipiency . . ." SEN. REP. #698, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914). Compare the Wagner Act § 2, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1947), the avowed purpose of which is to be increase labor's bargaining power, -with
the Norris-LaGuardia Act §3, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1947),
prohibiting the enforcement of "yellow dog" contracts. The one enactment directly
reduces a citadel of power; the other attempts (obliquely) to control the exercise
thereof. Professor Edwards, however, advocates the enforcement of § 3 of the Clay-
ton Act and even more stringent measures: "In a revised statute the definition 6f
tying arrangements should be extended to include all arrangements that have the
effect of binding or inducing any buyer or seller to deal exclusively with another, and
likewise all arrangements by which the purchase or sale of one commodity is made
conditional upon the purchase or sale of others. It should also cover similar arrange-
ments applicable to agencies and consignment sales. All tying arrangements should
be illegal if they are brought about by coercive pressures or if they have the effect of
coercing competitors, excluding them from the market, or substantially lessening
competition. This blanket prohibition should be supplemented by more specific pro-
visions forbidding tying arrangements applicable to any commodity or service which
is subject to a legal monopoly and tying arrangements where either party to the
transaction controls a preponderant amount of the total output or of the total sales
within a trade area." EDWARDS, An Appraisal of the Antitrust Laws, 36 PRoC. AM.
EcoN. Ass'N 172, 178 (1946).
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should abandon the effort to eliminate monopoly factors on the "hori-
zontal" level it would, of course, be necessary to rely upon the Clayton
Act. To preserve a semblance of free market allocation of resources,
we should have to bear down on the "abuses." But diversification is
not itself an abuse. It is only one of several means of utilizing a
monopolistic power. Thus even in a "balanced force" polity diversifi-
cation need not be condemned as such. The same conclusion would
follow if we yield to the importunities of those who would adopt a
program of national socialism. A socialist regime, benevolent or other-
wise, cannot object to any structure of industry on the grounds that it
tends to create a monopoly. For socialism implies (governmental)
monopoly.
Diversification may lead to tremendous size without horizontal
monopoly. A concern may acquire large resources and remain without
undue strength in any one market. This, of course, is the old problem
of wealth. Today the crushing burden of taxation can be counted upon
rapidly to dissipate the fortunes of natural persons. There remain the
corporations, which gather the savings of millions into managed focus.
The Supreme Court has said that mere size is not an offense.227 But
Professors Simons and Edwards argued that a vast concentration of
financial power, even in the absence of monopoly, offends the public
interest.228 In one old decision it was quaintly said:
All experience has shown that large accumulations of prop-
erty, in hands likely to keep it intact for a long period, are danger-
ous to the public weal. Having perpetual succession, any kind
of a corporation has peculiar facilities for such accumulation, and
most governments have found it necessary to exercise great cau-
tion in their grants of corporate powers. . . . Freed, as such
bodies are, from the sure bound to the schemes of individuals-
227. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920):
... The Corporation is undoubtedly of impressive size and it takes an effort of
resolution not to be affected by it or to exaggerate its influence. But we must adhere
to the law and the law does not make mere size an offense . . ."
228. Thus Professor Edwards said: "Bigness gives power whether it is attained
in one industry or in many. Great size is common to all giant enterprises whether
their strength is based upon monopoly in a single large industry, upon vertical integra-
tion, or upon a conglomerate union of activities which are industrially unrelated. The
significance of bigness alone is seen most readily in the case of the conglomerate
enterprise, in which power due to size is not reinforced by power due to monopoly
or to vertical integration." EvWARDs, MAINTAINING COMPETITION: REQUIsITEs OF
A GOVERNMENTAL POLICY 100 (1949) ; SImONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SocIry
95 (1948).
Professor Simons also said: "Even if the much advertised economies of gigantic
financial combinations were real, sound policy would wisely sacrifice these economies
to preservation of more economic freedom and equality." Id. at 52. And: "We
should look toward a situation in which the size of ownership units in every industry
is limited by the minimum size of operating plant requisite to efficient, but highly
specialized, production-and even more narrowly limited, if ever necessary to the
maintenance of freedom of enterprise." Id. at 60. Cf. Handler, Unfair Competition,
21 IOWA L. REv. 175, 208 (1936).
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the grave-they are able to add field to field and power to power,
until they become entirely too strong for that society which is
made up of those whose plans are limited by a single life.2 9
Obviously there is a relationship between diversification and size:
a tiny concern can scarcely produce many items. Thus Thorp found
that the 50 largest corporations in the United States were active in
making 2,043 products, that number constituting almost half the num-
ber of "products" distinguished in the 1937 Census of Manufacturers."'
Three-fourths of the largest concerns made 100 or less products; one
made 320 products; and the least diversified made only six.m1 There
is not, however, any necessary correlation between diversification and
size since an enterprise can grow large in the production or distribu-
tion of a single commodity.
Whether wealth alone is objectionable is a subject beyond the
scope of this paper. If it is, what should be done about it is likewise
another topic.2"2 All we can now conclude is that diversification as
such is not monopolistic.
229. Central R.R. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582, 629 (1869). Cf. State ex rel. Steuben-
ville Gas Co. v. Taylor, 55 Ohio St. 61, 65, 44 N.E. 513, 515 (1896).
230. THORP AND CROWDER, op. cit. supra note 49, at 586.
231. Id. at 595.
232. It may be difficult to determine when objectionable size has been achieved.
EDwARDs, op. cit. supra note 143, at 131. Perhaps forces of nature will take care of
many such situations. Thus Professor Simons said (op. cit. supra note 228, at 87):
"But the ways of competition are devious, and its vengeance--government intervention
apart-will generally be adequate and admirable."
